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UNTYING THE KNOT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH
DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES COURT
RECORDS, 1858-1866
Danaya C. Wright *
I. INTRODUCTION
Historians of Anglo-American family law consider 1857 as a
turning point in the development of modern family law and the
first big step in the breakdown of coverture' and the recognition
of women's legal rights.2 In 1857, The United Kingdom Parlia-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. This arti-
cle is a continuation of my research into nineteenth-century English family law reform.
My research at the Public Record Office was made possible by generous grants from the
University of Florida, Levin College of Law. I would like to thank the faculty at the Uni-
versity of Florida and Washington and Lee University for their valuable comments at
presentations, and I would like to thank Bill Nelson, John P. Reid, and the New York Uni-
versity School of Law Legal History Colloquium for their comments and suggestions. I
would also like to thank the following people for their comments, support, and enthusi-
asm: Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Sharon Rush,
Nancy Dowd, Greg Alexander, David Papke, Margaret Brinig, Katherine Bartlett, Norma
Basch, and Michael Gold. Enormous thanks go to Kendal Broad and Liz Fakazis who lived
with this article almost as much as I did.
1. Coverture is a legal doctrine in which a woman's legal existence is subsumed into
that of her husband upon marriage. While in a state of coverture-so long as she remains
married-she is unable to own property, control her own wages, enter into contracts, make
her own will, or be sued. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
2. See A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW: 1857-1957 (R.H. Graveson & F.R. Crane eds.,
1957); W.R. CORNISH & G. DE N. CLARK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND: 1750-1950 (1989);
A.V. DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
43-44 (2d ed. 1914); ALLEN HORSTMAN, VICTORIAN DIVORCE (1985); B.H. LEE, DIVORCE
LAW REFORM IN ENGLAND (1974); O.R. MCGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND: A CENTENARY
STUDY (1957); MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN
ENGLAND (1989) [hereinafter SHANLEY, FEMINISM]; LAWRENCE STONE, BROKEN LIVES:
SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN ENGLAND, 1660-1857 (1993) [hereinafter STONE, BROKEN
LIVES]; LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987 (1990) [hereinafter
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE]; Rebecca Probert, The Double Standard of Morality in the Di-
vorce and Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 28 ANGLO-AMER. L. REV. 73 (1999); Mary Lyndon
Shanley, "One Must Ride Behind": Married Women's Rights and the Divorce Act of 1857,
25 VICT. STUD. 355 (1982) [hereinafter Shanley, "One Must Ride Behind"]; S.M. Waddams,
English Matrimonial Law on the Eve of Reform, 1828-1857, 21 LEGAL HIST. 59 (2000);
Sybil Wolfram, Divorce in England: 1700-1857, 5 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1985);
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ment ("Parliament") created a new civil court to handle all di-
vorce and matrimonial causes, removing the jurisdiction of: the
ecclesiastical courts over marital validity; the Chancery over cus-
tody of children and separate estates; the royal courts over mari-
tal property; and Parliament over full divorce. The new Divorce
and Matrimonial Causes Court, a wing of the admiralty and pro-
bate courts, would handle all matters familial beginning in 1858.'
The idea of creating a unified court to handle all issues of fam-
ily breakdown was a product of the nineteenth-century reform
movement and a recognition that the family was a social institu-
tion that deserved a protected legal status. Rather than continue
to treat family property as a subset of property law and child cus-
tody as a part of the Chancery's parens patriae jurisdiction, this
new court brought legal disputes together around a central char-
acteristic: the family. The family, or at least the marital couple,
emerged as a legal entity around which ancillary family-related
legal issues would revolve. The rights and duties associated with
family relationships were defined first by reference to the family,
and only second by reference to the property, custody, or equity
issues that arose in family creation and family breakdown.
The 1858 divorce court was the first attempt in the Anglo-
American legal system to create a court specially dedicated to the
family,5 a court that would take a holistic approach to what was
Margaret Woodhouse, The Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 260
(1959).
3. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in Eng-
land, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857) (Eng.). For a history of the debates leading to the creation
of the divorce court, see SHANLEY, FEMINISM, supra note 2; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, sU-
pra note 2; Shanley, "One Must Ride Behind," supra note 2; Danaya Wright, The Crisis of
Child Custody: A History of the Birth of Family Law in England, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 175 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, The Crisis].
4. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (Eng.).
5. Of course, legal scholars are not unaware of the multiple definitions of family that
exist, and that anthropological usages of the term may differ from legal usages. Where an-
thropologists might refer to clans, political groupings, persons related by blood, as well as
the Victorian nuclear family all by the term 'family," lawyers use the term more narrowly
to describe the marital and parental relationships that give rise to changing legal status
and corresponding rights and obligations. For anthropologists and sociologists, marriage
may be rooted in the family, but for lawyers, the family is rooted in marriage. Through
marriage, independent legal actors acquire new rights and obligations toward each other,
their offspring, and their property. Placing marriage at the center of the family means
that family law is centered on the legal events of marriage, divorce, childbirth, death, and
adoption. And while there were clear laws dealing with these family issues prior to 1857,
they had not been officially aggregated into a single, interrelated area of law in which de-
terminations in one area would affect other areas. The 1858 court created a space in which
all family-related issues would become interlinked and interdependent. See, e.g., CORNISH
& CLARK, supra note 2, at 382-90; STEPHEN CRETNEY & J.M. MASSON, PRINCIPLES OF
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perceived in the 1850s to be a social and moral crisis-the so-
called divorce epidemic among the wealthy, and the exclusion
from divorce by a rapidly-growing, vocal middle class.6 And al-
though many aspects of women's disabilities under coverture re-
mained intact in the new court, married women's demands for le-
gal reform and independent legal rights influenced much of the
reform rhetoric.7 Compared to the disabilities of coverture, the
new court certainly improved the status of women by occasionally
redistributing matrimonial property upon marital termination-
periodically assigning custody of the children to the wife, and
FAMILY LAW 82-83 (5th ed. 1990); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY
LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 149-51
(1989); KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, FAMILY LAW MATTERS (1993); Michael Freeman, Family
Values and Family Justice, 50 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 313 (1997); Wright, The Crisis, su-
pra note 3, at 248-67.
6. Ironically, members of Parliament and many reformers viewed the growing num-
bers of divorce petitions to constitute an "epidemic" in the 1850s, even though the numbers
were generally about four per year. We would hardly call such low numbers an epidemic,
though the term was appropriate in light of the intense pressure to make divorce available
to a wider class of people. What lawmakers and reformers imagined was a flood of divorce
applications that threatened to destabilize the central role of marriage in Victorian soci-
ety. See HORSTMAN, supra note 2; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2; Shanley, "One
Must Ride Behind," supra note 2; see also FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED BY HER MAJESTY TO ENQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF DIVORCE, AND MORE
PARTICULARLY INTO THE MODE OF OBTAINING DIVORCES A VINCULO MATRIMONII (1853)
[hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION ON DIVORCE], reprinted in 18 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS, 1 MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 18 (1969).
7. Although there is great disagreement as to whether the reform was caused pri-
marily by lawyers and lawmakers who were fed up with the burdensome dissolution proc-
ess, see Probert, supra note 2; Woodhouse, supra note 2; Wright, The Crisis, supra note 3,
or by the demands of feminist reformers, Shanley, "One Must Ride Behind," supra note 2,
or by the demands of the increasingly powerful middle class and a belief in contractarian
individuality, see DOROTHY M. STETSON, A WOMAN'S ISSUE: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY LAW
REFORM IN ENGLAND (1982); STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2; Lee Holcombe, Victo-
rian Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women's Property Law, 1857-1882, in A
WIDENING SPHERE: CHANGING ROLES OF VICTORIAN WOMEN 3-20 (Martha Vicinus ed.,
1977), or by the general progressiveness of the late nineteenth century and the war peri-
ods, see Wolfram, supra note 2, or was a sop to avoid greater reforms in the franchise and
married women's property, see CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 2; S. MACCOBY, ENGLISH
RADICALISM: 1853-1886 (1938), there is no question that women's demands for greater re-
form, particularly in married women's property rights, made lawmakers nervous. Much of
the debates in Parliament mirrored arguments made by Caroline Norton in her two im-
portant pamphlets, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN ON LORD CHANCELLOR CRANWORTH'S
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE BILL (1855) [hereinafter NORTON, LETTER TO THE QUEEN] , and
CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE: ENGLISH LAWS FOR WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(Academy Chicago 1982) (1854) [hereinafter NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE]. See,
e.g., BARBARA LEIGH SMITH BODICHON, A BRIEF SUMMARY, IN PLAIN LANGUAGE, OF THE
MOST IMPORTANT LAWS OF ENGLAND CONCERNING WOMEN, TOGETHER WITH A FEW
OBSERVATIONS THEREON (1854); HARRIET TAYLOR MILL, ENFRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN
(Virago Press Ltd. 1983) (1851); EMILY NUGENT, A NARRATIVE OF THE CASE OF THE
MARCHIONESS OF WESTMEATH (1857); [hereinafter NUGENT, WESTMEATH]; see also
SHANLEY, FEMINISM, supra note 2 at 22-48; Shanley, "One Must Ride Behind," supra note
2.
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permitting wives to petition for and receive a full divorce with the
right to remarry. Prior to the creation of the new court, only four
English wives had received a parliamentary divorce, and only on
aggravated grounds of incestuous adultery and bigamous adul-
tery.' Cruelty, adultery, bigamy, desertion, drunkenness, and
other more traditional grounds had only given wives a right to an
ecclesiastical divorce a mensa et thoro, which was a separation
without the right to remarry.9
The creation of the court marked the final shift in the modern
secularization of divorce and an acceptance of the appropriate-
ness of judicial oversight in matrimonial affairs. ° The creation of
a civil court to handle these varied aspects of legal divorce was a
rejection of ecclesiastical and legislative control over the marital
relationship as well as a unification of family property, custody,
and marital status. The property rights of the parties would be-
come intertwined with the custody needs of children and an ethic
of marital fault. For over a century, marital fault would become
the focus, the key to divorce, a determinant in property distribu-
tions, and a major factor in determining the best interests of chil-
dren." The administrative logistics of negotiating the breakdown
of the marital relationship would be made simpler and less costly,
thus making the remedy available to a wider class of litigants.
The new court dealt the final death blow to the ecclesiastical
courts and the highly selective and guarded parliamentary di-
vorce. Its rules were the precursor to modern family law and led
the way toward the creation of specialized family courts, whose
8. Georgina Hall Divorce, 1850, 13 & 14 Vict., c. 25 (Eng.); Ann Battersby Divorce,
1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 48 (Eng.); Louisa Turton Divorce, 1831, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 35 (Eng.);
Jane Campbell (Mrs. Addison) Divorce, 1801, 41 Geo. III, c. 102 (Eng.).
9. RICHARD HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 100-01
(1974).
10. It was not just any judicial oversight, however, that would be acceptable. The 1857
Act provided that the Court would operate under the aegis of the Lord Chancellor, the pre-
siding judges of the three common law courts, and a Judge Ordinary. Parliament rejected
the idea that county court judges or justices of the peace be given the power to grant di-
vorces or try issues of adultery. See CRETNEY & MASSON, supra note 5, at 82-84. Granting
of divorce was to remain firmly within the highest level royal courts. As one member of
Parliament noted, however, it was ironic that it took only one judge to hang a man and
three to divorce him. 147 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 758-59. For the most thorough trea-
tise on the law and procedures of the new court, see JOHN FRASER MACQUEEN, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND LEGITIMACY, AS
ADMINISTERED IN THE DIVORCE COURT AND IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, (2d ed. 1860).
11. I have discussed at length the interconnection between marital fault and child
custody that arose in the new court, arguing that it frustrated the demands of female re-
formers who wanted maternal rights independent of marital performance. See Wright, The
Crisis, supra note 3, at 238-48.
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procedures and rules were believed to minimize the animosity,
destructiveness, and expense of traditional adversarial litiga-
tion. 1
2
Although some Protestant countries and many states in the
United States had experimented with certain aspects of civil di-
vorce, or with breaking down aspects of coverture through mar-
ried women's property acts before 1857,'" England was the leader
in creating a unified court to handle all matters matrimonial.
Unified family courts of today had their origins in the Divorce
and Matrimonial Causes Court of 1858. Yet despite the recogni-
tion of the court's place in the history of family law and the his-
tory of divorce, no historian has thoroughly studied the court's
early records. The handful of cases that were eventually reported
out of the court,'14 and the Law Commission Report that recom-
mended its creation, have generally been the basis of most schol-
arship on the incredible changes in family law wrought in the
nineteenth century.15 This lapse is understandable, however, be-
cause the records were sealed for 100 years to protect the privacy
12. See Freeman, supra note 5, for a thorough discussion of how well family law and a
unified family court have achieved these goals. See also GLENDON, supra note 5, at 291-
313.
13. New York, for instance, had a married women's property act passed in 1848, and
civil divorce was allowed in most New England states since the colonial period. RODERICK
PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY (1988). Massa-
chusetts, as early as 1660 had civil divorce. COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS: 1660-
1672, 143 (Rothman & Co. 1995) (1660). Connecticut did as well by 1677. Record of the
General Court, Oct. 18, 1677, reprinted in 2 The Public Records of the Colony of Connecti-
cut 328 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed., 1852), available at http://www.colonialct.uconn.edu
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004); see also 3 GEORGE E. HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL
INSTITUTIONS (Humanities Press, 1964) (1904).
14. There is a four volume set of reports, which reported seventy-nine cases between
1858 and 1860, ninety-seven cases between 1860 and 1862, ninety-one from 1862 to 1864,
and sixty-three in 1865, for a total of 330 cases in a period that saw more than 2,000 peti-
tions filed. M.C. MERTTINS SWABEY & THOMAS HUTCHINSON TRISTRAM, REPORTS OF THE
CASES DECIDED IN THE COURT OF PROBATE AND IN THE COURT FOR DIVORCE AND
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES (London: Butterworths) (1863).
15. In the late 1950s, when Griselda Rowntree and Norman Carrier undertook a sta-
tistical analysis of divorce in England, they were given permission to view the Divorce and
Matrimonial Court's records for only a single year out of the court's first fifty, 1871.
Griselda Rowntree & Norman Carrier, The Resort to Divorce in England and Wales, 1858-
1957, 11 POPULATION STUD. 188, 218 (1958). Not surprisingly, they found it very unsatis-
fying to try to make a comparison between late nineteenth-century divorce and separation
actions and early twentieth-century actions when they were given access to only two years'
court records. Although civil jurisdiction over divorce was established in England in 1858
through the creation of the new Divorce Court, the thousands of petitions, answers, and
affidavits from those cases were sealed until the 1980s. In the meantime, Rowntree and
Carrier were able to look to other sources for their study, such as census records and the
court dockets, but they were unable to examine the wealth of information available in the
actual court papers.
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of the litigants. Thus, only recently have these records become
available for scholarly analysis. In my own work on the law of
domestic relations in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Eng-
land, I quickly realized the gap that existed in our understanding
of the rise of civil divorce and I determined to delve into this
wealth of material. This article represents an initial analysis of
the first decade of the court's records and is intended to note some
initial patterns and make suggestions for further research.
Over 2,500 petitions were filed in the first nine years of the
court's existence, yet less than 10% resulted in published case re-
ports. And while the rules of law that emerged from the court are
critical in understanding the history of divorce in England, so too
are the details we can glean from the thousands of litigants who
turned to the court to resolve their domestic problems. In an at-
tempt to get into the lives of the forgotten families whose only
memorials are their divorce petitions, I spent time over two sum-
mers examining the court files and analyzing them along
numerous axes of gender, age, marital faults, and remedies. I ex-
amined the petitions, answers, affidavits, and the court's docket
for the nine-year period from 1858 to 1866, in an attempt to un-
cover what I could of the lives of the litigants and the practices of
the court in its first nine years.
This article is not exhaustive and I have limited myself to re-
porting the data in as clear and accessible a manner possible.
Many of my conclusions, interpretations, and motives I am forced
to leave for another article, as explaining the history of the court
and exploring its records has already resulted in a perhaps too-
lengthy recitation of the material I uncovered. But to entice the
reader to bear with me through the details of the court's first nine
years, I can promise a number of surprising conclusions. Al-
though the court was given a relatively weak mandate, some
truly modern practices emerged.16 Joint custody orders for chil-
dren were not common, but did occur.17 Child support orders were
sometimes made distinct from alimony orders.'" The court was
very good to wives, who had a higher success rate in their divorce
and separation actions than husbands, as well as in custody and
16. See Jacob Goldstein & C. Abraham Fenster, Anglo-American Criteria for Resolving
Child Custody Disputes from the Eighteenth Century to the Present: Reflections on the Role
of Socio-Cultural Change, 19 J. FAM. HIST. 35-39 (1994).
17. See infra tbl. 14.
18. See infra note 264 and accompanying text; MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 176.
[Vol. 38:903
ENGLISH DIVORCE LAW
alimony petitions. 9 And the court did permit the filing of a hand-
ful of petitions in forma pauperis despite the fact that it would be
well into the next century before a regularized program of legal
aid would make the courts available to needy citizens.2" The judge
of the first four years was not a particularly liberal or activist
judge, but he was scrupulous and fair.
The data also revealed a few troubling things. The vast major-
ity of wives left the court with no property and no indication of fu-
ture financial support even when they were not responsible for
the termination of their marriage.22 Very few wives even asked
for alimony or custody of their children. The grounds for marital
termination for wives-which consisted of aggravated adultery-
led to a depressing litany of violence, adultery, and desertion in
the lives of these women. And an alarming number of wives aban-
doned their suits after filing, putting themselves at physical risk
of retaliation by violent husbands and then ultimately failing to
receive any kind of protection.23 At the same time, the high
numbers of orders protecting deserted wives' property showed a
significant number of women operating in the economic market-
place who had amassed enough wealth to hire an attorney and
independently petition the court for redress.
Perhaps the most significant, and absurdly obvious, finding is
that husbands and wives were differently situated in their ability
to go to the courts to resolve their family disputes and that those
differences changed over the age of a marriage. Young wives ap-
proached the court under very different circumstances than mid-
dle-aged wives or older wives. In fact, the variability among the
petitioners as the marriages aged appear to have been more in-
fluential than the actual substantive legal rules in determining a
petitioner's claims before the court. While these kinds of findings
force us to examine the law and society question more closely24-
19. See infra tbls. 5, 11, 20.
20. See MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 365; CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 2, at 387;
CRETNEY & MASSON, supra note 5, at 90.
21. See infra Section III.
22. See infra Sections VI.B.-D. and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part V.A. on the greater physical threat women face after filing divorce
or separation papers on the grounds of violence or cruelty. See also Rebecca Dobash &
Russell Dobash, Violence Against Women in the Family, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW
AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 495, 497 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds.,
2000); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 43-49 (1991).
24. The law and society question examines whether law is primarily a product of so-
cial structures, or social structures are produced by law. Authors have written of early in-
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which I cannot do fully in this paper-they once again reinforce
the command that legal historians must place their analysis of
law within its broad social context. Besides relatively obvious
gender disparities that are revealed in these records, there are
also very complex age, class, and psychosocial disparities among
the hundreds of petitioners and respondents who used the court
in its first few years.
In detailing my findings, I leave for another time an analysis of
the theoretical underpinnings of the court's exercise of power
within the domestic sphere. While recognizing that no history is
devoid of subjective expressions of editorial and academic author-
ity, I postpone that discussion to a later time.25 And though I am
troubled with the interjection of state power into the private
sphere, I am also mollified by the legal improvements women
have experienced in the last century and a half. I am unsure
whether the new court improved the status and power of women
or relegated them more firmly to a disempowered domestic
sphere. But I cannot explore those questions until I know a little
more about the court's practices and what I can uncover about the
lives and complaints of the parties who sought legal resolution of
their domestic disputes. This article, therefore, is one in a much
longer series exploring the implications of civil divorce in
women's lives and the legal legacy of untying the knot.
II. WHY THE DIVORCE COURT?
Prior to 1858, a husband seeking a divorce or separation from
his wife had to obtain a divorce a mensa et thoro26 in the ecclesi-
astical courts, receive a damages award from his wife's seducer in
a criminal conversation action,27 then file a private act for divorce
fluential texts in the law and society movement. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, LAW AND
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION (1977); JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978).
25. See Danaya Wright, Well-Behaved Women Don't Make History: Rethinking English
Family, Law and History (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. The divorce a mensa et thoro was the ecclesiastical courts' version of a judicial
separation and was available for a variety of marital offenses, including: adultery; cruelty;
desertion; and bigamy. See CRETNEY & MASSON, supra note 5, at 82-83; see also STONE,
ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 192-93. The divorce did not allow either party to re-
marry and was often accompanied by an unenforceable alimony order. See STONE, ROAD
TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 192-97.
27. The criminal conversation action was an act for damages against the seducer of a
man's wife, and often resulted in awards in excess of £10,000. See STONE, ROAD TO
DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 231-32. It could only be brought against the male seducer of a
man's wife, and the wife had no right to intervene in the action because, under coverture,
[Vol. 38:903
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before both houses of Parliament and receive the royal signature
before he could be relieved of the obligation to support his wife
and remarry.2" The cost of a divorce in the early to mid-
nineteenth century was more than £1000 and could easily rise to
£5000 if the case were contested.29 A wife, on the other hand, was
entitled only to a divorce a mensa et thoro from the ecclesiastical
court. Any alimony order would be unenforceable without a sepa-
rate order from King's Bench or Common Pleas and she would
most certainly not receive custody of her children despite the fa-
ther's unfitness unless he posed a danger to life or limb.3" She
could not remarry, and though she might be returned to feme sole
status for purposes of any after-acquired property, she would lose
all right to any property or wages brought to the marriage and
any property acquired prior to the separation.3 Only four women
received parliamentary divorces in the 180 years that they were
available, on the grounds of incestuous adultery and adultery
combined with bigamy.32
The double standard was both a legal and a social fact. The law
treated adultery by the wife differently than adultery by the hus-
band.33 Wives who could prove only simple adultery were allowed
only a separation permitting them to live apart from the offend-
ing spouse, but not to form new marriages, manage their prop-
erty, or obtain legal rights to their children. Husbands could
make a clean break, start a new family, and restructure all their
affairs upon a wife's adultery alone. Socially, too, the double
standard made it difficult for fallen women to regain their social
position or resume their customary friendships.
she was deemed to have no legal existence. See id. at 234. Moreover, she was deemed un-
able to consent to the seduction. See id.; see also LAURA HANFT KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL
CONVERSATIONS: SENTIMENTALITY AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGAL STORIES OF
ADULTERY 20-26 (1998); Susan Staves, Money for Honor: Damages for Criminal Conversa-
tion, 11 STUD. IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CULTURE 279, 279-97 (1982).
28. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 159.
29. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 187-90, 355-56.
30. See Danaya C. Wright, DeManneville v. DeManneville: Rethinking the Birth of
Custody Law Under Patriarchy, 17 LAw & HIST. REV. 247, 247, 256 (1999) [hereinafter
Wright, DeManneville]. The Chancery had established a double standard in child custody
cases, giving the children to the mother only in cases in which the father posed a danger to
life or limb, but giving the children to third parties who challenged the father's or both
parents' fitness upon a showing simply of best interests. See id.; see also Martha J. Bailey,
England's First Custody of Infants Act, 20 QUEENS L. J. 391, 393-401 (1995).
31. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 193-95.
32. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 174-75.
33. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 193.
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Not surprisingly, by the late 1840s, the law of domestic rela-
tions, or the law of baron and feme as it was called at the time,
was facing severe criticism from a variety of sources.34 The double
standard that allowed men a divorce but not women was criti-
cized by many progressives and women's rights advocates as be-
ing unfair to the oft-suffering wife.35 As many as four divorce ac-
tions were making their way to Parliament every year in the last
decades of its jurisdiction, which many Parliamentarians be-
moaned as a divorce epidemic.36 They wanted divorce to be prop-
erly discouraged as a social evil, especially the seduction and ru-
ination of men's families by libertines. Many in the evangelical
and temperance movements criticized the ease with which mari-
tal termination seemed possible, especially for the wealthy who
were seen as having a lax and lascivious moral code.3" And even
conservative lawyers and lawmakers criticized the unwieldy sys-
tem that had arisen which required multiple lawsuits and per-
haps many years before an innocent spouse could get on with his
or her life.
In 1850, Parliament established a commission on divorce to ex-
amine the problem and make recommendations for reform. In
1853, a lengthy report was published advocating the creation of a
civil court to combine the jurisdiction of: the ecclesiastical courts
over matrimonial faults; the chancery over custody of children;
the royal courts over certain aspects of property; and Parliament
over final divorce.3" The resulting court was tremendously impor-
tant in the history of family law and the family. In many ways, it
helped move married women from the legal non-existence of
coverture to the equal parties in a domestic partnership that is
envisioned by the law today. The court also redefined nearly the
entirety of the common law of domestic relations, much of which
34. See id.at 368.
35. See SHANLEY, FEMINISM, supra note 2 at 39-44; Ann Summer Holmes, The Double
Standard in the English Divorce Laws, 1857-1923, 20 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 612-615
(1995); Probert, supra note 2, at 79-83.
36. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
37. For a good summary of the evangelical and temperance attitudes to male sexual
license, see PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 419-20; JOHN TOSH, A MAN'S PLACE: MASCULINITY
AND THE MIDDLE-CLASS HOME IN ViCTORIAN ENGLAND (1999); Holmes, supra note 35, at
612-15. Mr. Walpole believed the double standard actually reined in male sexual license
by preventing them from getting their wives to divorce them simply by committing adul-
tery. 147 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1282. Men would also marry in order to prostitute
their wives and make money on unsuspecting lovers in criminal conversation actions. See
LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEx, AND MARRIAGE: IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 506 (1977)
[hereinafter STONE, THE FAMILY].
38. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 369.
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still prevails in Anglo-American law. The court was responsible
for making the transition between ecclesiastical and civil control
over marriage, and it inadvertently participated in the ever-
growing divorce epidemic that social conservatives have been be-
wailing since the 1860s.
III. THE NEW COURT'S PROCEDURE AND COMPOSITION
For the first five years a single judge, Sir Cresswell Cresswell,
presided over the new court-from 1858 until his untimely death
from a carriage accident in 1863."9 Sir Cresswell was the son of a
sailor, growing up off the coast of Northumberland, and after
studying law quickly became adept in maritime and admiralty is-
sues.4" He joined the Northern Circuit under the shadow of Henry
Brougham and John Williams, both great legal scholars and avid
litigators, and succeeded them to the bar when they became
judges.4' In 1837 he was elected to the House of Commons as
Conservative member for Liverpool, which he served until ap-
pointed a judgeship in the Court of Common Pleas by Sir Robert
Peel in 1843.42 After fourteen years on the bench, he was ap-
pointed Judge Ordinary for the new Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes Court.43 Sir Cresswell had also spent eight years covering
the decisions of the Court of Queen's Bench, producing one of the
more esteemed reporter series, Barnewell and Cresswell." It is
ironic that a man whose origins lay in maritime affairs, and
whose legal practice was in Queen's Bench and Common Pleas,
would be chosen to head the new divorce court, especially since he
never married and had no children. Sir Cresswell has been de-
scribed by commentators, however, as "an able lawyer, a man of
the world, and a thorough gentleman."4 More importantly, he
seemed to approach the job with few preconceptions about the le-
gal disabilities of wives under coverture or the perceived societal
importance of protecting the institution of marriage at all costs.
He appears to have been pragmatic about the odds of reconcilia-
tion, and commentators suggest that he approached his new posi-
39. See EDWARD MANSON, THE BUMDERS OF OUR LAW DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN
VicTORIA 82, 85-86 (1895).
40. Id. at 82.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 83.
43. Id. at 84.
44. Id. at 83.
45. Id. at 85.
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tion with a profound desire to "uph[olld the sanctity of marriage
while ... vindicat [ing] the rights of outraged spouses."46
The new court's law and procedure was a combination of rules
from the different courts it was replacing. The court was to take
over any matrimonial matters currently pending or any to be
brought in the future in the ecclesiastical courts.47 It was to act on
the principles of the ecclesiastical courts with regard to marital
validity, annulment, and separation.4" The Judge Ordinary was
also to "have the same Powers, Jurisdiction, and Authority as any
Judge of any of the said Superior Courts sitting at Nisi Prius."49
And the rules of evidence used in the royal courts at Westminster
were to apply in the new court, not the rules of the ecclesiastical
courts. 50 There was to be appeal from decisions of the Judge Or-
dinary to the full court, and then appeal from the full court to the
House of Lords.5' The appellate panel consisted of Sir Cresswell
plus two other judges from either King's Bench, Chancery, the
Exchequer, the Court of Probate, or Common Pleas.52
The statute nominally abolished the criminal conversation ac-
tion,53 but allowed a husband to seek damages against a co-
respondent for committing adultery with his wife, 4 and damages
were to be determined by a jury under the same grounds, on the
same principles, and subject to the same rules as the earlier ac-
tion for criminal conversation. 5 In a gesture of nominal equality,
a wife petitioning for a dissolution was entitled to join her hus-
band's mistress as co-respondent, just as a husband could join his
wife's lover as co-respondent.56
46. Id. at 86.
47. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in Eng-
land, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, §§ III-IV (1857) (Eng.). In fact, the first twenty or so cases in its
first month do not appear to have come from new petitions, but were transferred from
other courts. See infra Part IV.B.
48. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XXII.
49. Id. § XXXVIII.
50. Id. § XLVIII.
51. Id. §§ LV-LVI.
52. Id. § VIII. This was amended in 1859 to include all of the judges of these courts.
See An Act to Make Further Provision Concerning the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes, 1859, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 61, § I (Eng.).
53. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § LIX.
54. Id. § XXXIII.
55. Id. The damages could be applied to the judge "for the Benefit of the Children (if
any) of the Marriage, or as a Provision for the Maintenance of the Wife." Id.
56. Id. § XXVIII. In reviewing the cases, however, I never saw a single case in which a
wife did so, even when she named the partner of her husband's adultery in the petition.
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Most significantly, Sir Cresswell had the discretion to hear in
chambers any case in its entirety, except dissolution or annul-
ment, and he could order that any other matter be heard before
the full court." The full court would sit for two or three days at
each quarter-session and would hear testimony in dozens of cases
at a time. If Sir Cresswell decided to hear the case himself, it
would be scheduled at his convenience, usually earlier than those
requiring the three-judge panel." Hence, bench trials were usu-
ally resolved in less time than those before the full court and at
less cost. Divorce and annulment actions had to be heard before
the full court-though one member of Parliament did note the
irony of requiring three judges to divorce a man and only one to
hang him. 9 However, in 1860, the law was amended to allow the
Judge Ordinary to hear those suits alone.6 °
Sir Cresswell could also order a case tried to a jury, either a
special or a common jury.6" The special jury would give fact de-
terminations on numerous specific issues, such as whether adul-
tery was proved, cruelty was proved, or the parties had condoned
or colluded.62 The common jury, on the other hand, would simply
answer yea or nay on guilt or innocence of the totality of the al-
leged marital breach(es).' Juries also decided the amount of
damages against co-respondents in all of the cases involving dam-
ages for alienation of a wife's affections and, because of the cost,
were understandably not as prevalent as when an award of
damages in criminal conversation was required for a Parliamen-
tary divorce.64
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. An Act to Amend the Procedure and Powers of the Court for Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes, 23 & 24 Vict., c. 144, § 1 (1860) (Eng.).
60. 23 & 24 Vict., c. 144, § I (Eng.). The law was initially amended in 1859 to allow
more judges to hear divorce cases, and to allow the Judge Ordinary to amend property set-
tlements, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 61, §§ I, V (Eng.).
61. There are two kinds of special juries. The first is a jury pool of persons of superior
states or special knowledge. The Common Law Procedure Act, 15 &16 Vict., c. 76, § 108
(1852) (Eng.), provided the procedure for calling for a special jury. Also, a jury could return
a special verdict which would be a finding of certain facts that would leave the application
of law to the judge. Although the docket referred to the jury as a "special jury," the de-
tailed findings indicate that the latter was the intent and practice of the court. See 2
WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH & COMMON Pleas in Per-
sonal Actions and Ejectment 841, 928 (London, Butterworth 1828).
62. See 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH & COMMON
Pleas in Personal Actions and Ejectment 841, 928 (London, Butterworth 1828).
63. Id.
64. See 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XXXIII (Eng.); see also LAW REFORM COMM'N OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA, REPORT ON INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH DOMESTIC RELATIONS 8-20
20041
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The court sat in London, hough the Parliamentary debates
showed an awareness of the limitations inherent in such a rule.
Lawmakers debated heavily the location of the court and noted
that unless these cases could be tried in county courts, the divorce
court would never be available to all classes of people. 65 To bal-
ance the desire to discourage divorces by making them difficult to
obtain, and the desire to make the remedy available to all Eng-
lishmen, the 1857 Act provided that the court would sit in Lon-
don, but that evidence could be taken and factual issues tried at
nisi prius in the local courts, and the petitioners did not need to
appear in court unless explicitly ordered to do so by the judge.66
One important question I had was whether a class of profes-
sional divorce lawyers would arise to dominate the docket in this
new court. To determine that, I noted the attorneys for the par-
ties in every case that I analyzed in full.6 7 Notably, there were
only a small handful of lawyers, seven, whose names appeared in
more than ten cases.6" Given that there were over a thousand pe-
titions filed in the first three and one-third years, the infrequency
of repeat players speaks to the relatively haphazard origins of the
new family law.69 The Act allowed lawyers who practiced in the
law courts, the equity courts, and the ecclesiastical courts to prac-
tice before the new court. Naturally, it would take time to develop
a dedicated bar in matrimonial matters that could coordinate
their influence and help establish a new, coherent family law.
Despite being positioned in an established court, Sir Cresswell
appears to have been fairly innovative in considering the overall
(1983) (discussing the decline of criminal conversation and the resulting actions of adul-
tery and enticement); Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 218-23 (1986) (noting the abolition of criminal conversation in
1857).
65. See, e.g., 144 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1698.
66. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in Eng-
land, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XL (1857) (Eng.). Nisi prius developed in the 1200s as a way to
allow itinerant judges to take certain evidence and hear certain verdicts out in the coun-
ties, away from their principal seats at Westminster. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 20-22 (4th ed. 2002).
67. This is the Court Docket database which consists of the court docket for every case
in 1858 and for January, April, July, and October of 1859, 1860, and January and April of
1861-twenty-two months. I also perused the cases filed in the other eighteen months of
1859 through April of 1861.
68. They were Gregory, Ibbetson, Johnson, Lewis, Nelson, Pritchards, and Wright.
69. In 1851 there were 2,816 members of the registered bar, and in 1861 there were
3,071 members. DANIEL DuMAN, THE ENGLISH AND COLONIAL BARS IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 7, tbl. 1.2 (1983).
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equities in the cases before him.7" But, he was not a radical judge
who sought to completely remake the family law of the period. A
wife or husband who had been ill-used by her or his spouse could
expect to find some relief in Sir Cresswell's court, but great devia-
tion from the pre-existing rules of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas,
the Chancery, and the ecclesiastical courts was unlikely. Ironi-
cally, in the first few years the court was perhaps at its most in-
novative, but it eventually developed precedents that had to be
followed even when the equities might lean elsewhere, and some
of Sir Cresswell's decisions were overturned on appeal, thus
slowly tempering any overly hasty assertions of his discretionary
powers." What is interesting about studying the records of the
first few years of the court's existence is that we can observe the
subtle and not-so-subtle influences that helped form the first uni-
fied family law in our common law system.
IV. MATERIALS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY: NINE YEARS OF
DIVORCE PETITIONS
A. The Petitions
The divorce court opened its doors in January 1858 to a trickle
of cases. In the first month no petitions were filed, though twenty
cases were transferred in from other courts. Of the petitions filed
between February 1, 1858 and December 31, 1866, I examined
every fifth petition-unless it was missing, in which case I would
substitute the sixth petition-plus I examined every petition for
the nine-year period in which the petitioner's last name began
with an A.72 During that nine-year period, 2,540 petitions were
filed and I examined 602, or almost 24%. For that period, the
number of petitions filed per month remained relatively steady,
between five and six petitions per month that I examined, which
70. See, e.g., Spratt v. Spratt, 164 Eng. Rep. 699 (D. 1858) (noting that the divorce
court's power over custody of children was more discretionary than the power of Queen's
Bench under habeas corpus); Curtis v. Curtis, 164 Eng. Rep. 688, 698-99 (D. 1858) (noting
that the divorce court's power was less extensive than the Chancery's with regard to per-
manent custody orders, but made an interim order of custody to facilitate the parties'
seeking a remedy in a different court).
71. See, e.g., Curtis v. Curtis, 28 L. J. R. (n.s.) Chanc. 458 (1859) (the Curtis case ap-
peal).
72. The petitions were organized alphabetically and chronologically, and the petitions
for a certain block of years were organized together, 1858-1866 (sixty-three boxes and
2,540 petitions), 1867-1884 (269 boxes and 10,000 petitions), 1885-1898 (20,045 peti-
tions), 1899-1909 (10,000 petitions).
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would average out to between twenty and twenty-five per month
filed. There was a gradual decline in petitions after the first two
years, with a steep decline in 1866."3 The petitions were filed by
both husbands and wives and could request any of a variety of
remedies: divorce; judicial separation; restitution of conjugal
rights; annulment; alimony; a declaration of legitimacy; or protec-
tion of property. The overwhelming majority of husbands sued
their wives for divorce and always for adultery, with a handful of
separation, conjugal rights, and annulment actions thrown in.
Wives, on the other hand, sued for divorce and judicial separation
in more equal numbers, had a significant number of property pe-
titions, and, like husbands, a handful of conjugal rights, annul-
ment, and alimony actions. There were also a few legitimacy peti-
tions.74 Because the orders protecting property are not actions
directly involving marital termination or marital relations, I
treated them separately for certain of the analyses. Dropping out
the protective orders for property shows that the number of peti-
tions filed for marital termination" were more consistent over the
nine-year period.76 For simplicity's sake, I refer to this database
as the "Petitions."77
73. Most likely this was not caused by some external factor, but rather indicates a
change in the way records were kept that year.
74. Legitimacy petitions were brought by illegitimate children seeking to inherit from
their fathers or other paternal relations. The suits claimed their parents were legally mar-
ried and usually involved marriages performed abroad or marriages between an English
citizen and a foreigner. See MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 346-58; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 93, An
Act to Enable Persons to Establish Legitimacy & the Validity of Marriages, & the Right to
be Deemed Natural-born Subjects (1858).
75. Petitions for remedies based on marital offenses or impediments are divorce, judi-
cial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, and annulment.
76. There were fifty petitions filed just for orders of protection of property by married
women who had been deserted. These were disproportionately filed in the first couple of
years of the court's existence-sixteen in 1858, five in 1859, three in 1860, five in 1861,
three in 1862, five in 1863, three in 1864, three in 1865, and three in 1866.
77. Much of my analysis is necessarily limited by the data available. While it was in-
credibly rich and substantial, it was also repetitive. There were over sixty boxes of peti-
tions, each wrapped and tied individually with the answer and affidavits. They were ar-
ranged alphabetically and chronologically, so there were numerous boxes of petitions by
petitioners whose last name began with each letter, and each box held approximately forty
petitions. Within the boxes, the petitions were numbered chronologically. The Public Re-
cords Office started a new set of boxes after 1866 and began again alphabetically. The pe-
titions were handwritten and covered three to four pages on average. The affidavits gen-
erally repeated much of the same information, and the answers were generally shorter. In
each petition, the parties would state the date and location of marriage, the number of
children, alive and deceased, the current residence of the parties, sometimes the occupa-
tions of the parties, the events surrounding the alleged marital offense(s), and the relief
requested. Every answer stated a general denial and a majority included excuses or alle-
gations of provocation, condonation, connivance, or independent fault on the part of the
petitioner.
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See Table 1 in Appendix:
Total Number of Petitions Filed (1858-1866)
B. The Docket
I also reviewed every case recorded in the court docket for the
three and one-third years from January 1858 until April 1861.78
For the first year, 1858, I examined every case filed and took ex-
tensive notes on their disposition by the court. For the rest of the
period, I only took extensive notes on the cases filed in January,
April, July, and October of those years-1859 through April
1861."9 This database includes detailed information for a total of
twenty-two months, and I refer to it as the "Court Docket." I then
took summary notes of limited information for the other
months-the remaining eighteen months of the period-and put
that information into a database I refer to as "Summary Docket."
In many instances, I analyzed data from both docket databases if
I collected the relevant information in both data sets. But for
other information, like the names of the attorneys, or dates of fil-
ing alimony petitions, I used only the more thorough Court
Docket database.8 0
78. This period was much shorter because the record keeping changed in 1861. For
this first period, the court kept its records in seven folio volumes of 350 pages, with each
page devoted to a new case. After April 1861 the court shifted to individual records that
were kept with the petitions and other case records.
79. I chose those months for no reason except the thought that more actions might
have been filed around the quartersession dates when the full court sat, but there was in
fact little variation per month in the filing of petitions, though great variation in the times
and dates hearings were held and final rules granted.
80. Though I have looked at every case docketed in the three and one-third year pe-
riod, I do not have detailed information for every case. Thus, for certain issues, I look at
just one docket database, and for others, I look at both. Then, wherever possible, I cross
reference the docket databases to the petitions database to see how those two compare. In
the Court Docket database, I collected the following information: the names of parties; the
attorneys; gender of petitioner; the date the petition was filed; the relief requested;
whether it was opposed; the date the hearing was set; whether the hearing was before Sir
Cresswell himself or the full court; the date of filing alimony petition; date of granting of
the alimony petition and the amount ordered; the date a jury trial was held; the jury's
verdict; the date of final order; the final outcome; the grounds for the relief, the amount of
costs; the party taxed with costs; whether custody was requested and whether it was
granted; and any other miscellaneous information that pertained to the information col-
lected. For the Summary Docket database, I omitted all dates except the month of filing
the petition, and only collected the following information: the name of parties; whether
husband or wife filed the petition; the cause of action; the outcome; the grounds; whether
opposed or not; the amount of costs identified; the amount of alimony ordered; whether
there was a jury trial and its verdict; whether custody was requested and/or granted; and
any other miscellaneous information that seemed relevant.
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The docket held some new and some duplicate information
from that provided in the petitions. On each page of the docket
book, the court clerk had recorded the names of the parties, their
attorneys, the date the petition was filed, what relief was re-
quested, and then listed, in order, each pleading as it was filed,
noting when the respondent and/or co-respondent appeared, when
answers were filed, when alimony petitions were filed, when the
court set the cause down for a hearing, the make-up of the court
assigned to hear the case, delays and continuances caused by
failure to appear, dismissals by consent of the parties, and a brief
record of the final outcome. If there was a jury, the docket re-
corded the jury's verdict, and often the names of the jurors, and
then the court would enter a final order.
In many cases, the entries into the docket simply stop, mid-way
through the case, without reaching any form of resolution. Some
of these occurred early, as when the petition would be entered,
and then no further action was taken on the case. Others would
proceed even beyond a hearing and then, inexplicably, simply
end. If there was no final resolution-neither a grant nor denial
of the petition-I noted the case as having been "not continued,"
though I did not distinguish between cases not continued after fil-
ing the initial petition, and those that proceeded at some length,
perhaps through a hearing or two, before it dropped from the re-
cord. 81
81. There were seven folio volumes of docket books that listed all the filings and all of
the court's hearings in each case. Each volume consisted of 350 pages, and each new peti-
tion, as it was filed, was given the next blank recto page in the book. As one book filled,
the court went to the next book. Each case would then have the front and back side of each
page for its record. In three and one-third years, the court went through nearly seven vol-
umes, though many cases extended beyond the two allotted pages and then jump to the
next blank page in the next volume. This meant that a lengthy case could be recorded in
as many as five or six different volumes. Because cases were docketed as they were filed,
they are not alphabetical in the docket. The process was complicated to follow and was
most likely unwieldy for the clerk. Because a case could not be tracked easily, often requir-
ing reference to multiple volumes, and changes in court procedure in 1860 led to more
space being required, the docket volumes were phased out. The court shifted to require a
rule nisi followed by three months before the final divorce decree was final which meant
there were two lengthy recitations of the petition, the proof, the allegations, and the final
decree in the docket. After April 1861, the court shifted to individual pamphlets to record
each case. These pamphlets resembled modern-day blue books, with a cover and eight to
ten pages of lined paper. After the change, these docket pamphlets would be tied up with
the petitions in the petition boxes. Unfortunately, I did not realize that the changed proce-
dure would actually make it harder to look at the docket information, for when I obtained
the information from the petitions I looked cursorily at the docket and noted the final out-
come, but nothing else. Then when I went back to study the docket in depth, I was only
able to look at the seven volumes, and did not have time to go back through the dockets for
the remaining six and two-third years that are filed with the petitions. That project re-
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The number of cases docketed each year were fairly even,
though they too showed a steady decline over the period-373 in
1858, 330 in 1859, 306 in 1860, and 95 in the first four months of
1861.82 There were a total of 1,144 cases docketed in this period,
which shows the court handling 45% of its 2,540 petition caseload
in its first three and one-third years. 3
See Table 2 in Appendix:
Number of Cases Docketed Each Year (1858-1861)
The court was quite popular in its first few years, handling
over 1,00,0 divorce and judicial separation actions. Considering
there were only 379 parliamentary divorces requested in the 188
years between 1670 and the creation of the court in 1858, 4 we
can safely conclude that people did flock to the court in unprece-
dented numbers. This increase is despite Lord Brougham's pre-
diction that there would not "be any very great increase in the
number of divorces, although undoubtedly there might be some
slight increase when the hindrances which were presented at
present to persons of small means who wished to obtain divorces
were removed.""5 During the first three and one-third years of the
court's existence, 200 divorces were granted to wives, and 278 to
husbands. In the previous 188 years, only four wives had received
a parliamentary divorce. 6 In terms of sheer numbers, the court
clearly made divorce and separation newly available for wives
and middle-class husbands, though our understanding of who
these litigants were becomes much richer as we break down the
cases by factors such as gender, custody, property, and class.
mains for another year.
82. Separating out the protective property orders results in a leveling out of the num-
bers of petitions docketed per year-324 in 1858, 305 in 1859, 289 in 1860, and 87 in the
first four months of 1861-as we saw with the petitions.
83. Of the 2,540 petitions filed in nine years, 1,144 were docketed in the first three
and one-third years. See infra tbl. 2. Forty were of an unknown cause of action and there-
fore could not be indentified from the docket alone. See also infra tbl. 1.
84. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2 at 432, tbl. 10.1.
85. 146 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 207. This was an increase of over 150 times the
number of divorce petitions per year from the pre-court era.
86. Compare Wolfram, supra note 2, at 174-75, with STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE supra
note 2, at 432, tbl. 10.1. Stone identifies only two divorces granted to women, while Wolf-
ram identifies four. Wolfram's data appears more reliable because she gives the cites to
each one specifically, and her data corresponds to parliamentary returns. HORSTMAN, su-
pra note 2, at 24 (agreeing with Wolfram's statistics); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 174-75
nn.82, 84-86.
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V. FINDINGS
A. Gender and Marital Termination
The dual standard by which the law treated marital infidelity
is simply one indicator of gender inequality during the Victorian
period, though it was perhaps the most profound difference be-
tween the men and women who sought termination of their mar-
riages before the new court. The men who petitioned for divorce
almost uniformly alleged adultery by their wives and, if they ob-
tained their divorces, were relieved from further support, kept
custody of their children, and had the right to remarry. The
women who petitioned for a divorce or judicial separation did so
on the basis of a variety of claims, including adultery, adultery
mixed with cruelty or desertion, bigamy, sodomy, cruelty or de-
sertion alone, incest, or incapacity. 7 Only after a divorce could a
husband or wife remarry. The sexual double standard, therefore,
that permitted husbands to obtain a divorce simply by showing
adultery, but permitted wives to obtain a divorce only by showing
aggravated adultery, had significant effects on the ability of wives
to remarry. Though the numbers of men and women seeking ter-
mination of their marriages were roughly equal-with women fil-
ing slightly more petitions-women sought judicial separations,
which did not allow remarriage, in nearly half of the termination
actions they brought.' Thus, husbands obtained divorces, with
the right to remarry, nearly twice as often as did wives.
While the data reveals some significant gender differences, it is
difficult to determine whether they were merely the result of the
different adultery standards, or reflect important gender-based
socio-legal norms, behavior, and restraints. The questions are
made even more complex because men and women faced different
legal obligations regarding support, custody, and property. In
analyzing the gender differences presented by this data, I do so
with an eye toward discovering under what circumstances women
might have opted for a divorce over a judicial separation, what
benefits each provided, and the impact, if any, such choices had
on other aspects of marital termination, like custody of children
and control over marital property. While it is impossible to de-
87. See An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in
England, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XXVII (1857) (Eng.) (stating the grounds for divorce and
judicial separation for women).
88. See infra tbl. 5.
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termine the lived context in which these petitioners committed
adultery-whether there was collusion, connivance, or intolerable
home situations-the data does show some patterns for certain
classes of women that may reveal deeper social divisions.
In collecting the data, I noted the sex of the petitioners, the
cause of action requested, the grounds, the length of the mar-
riage, the number of children, and requests for alimony or cus-
tody. Some petitions were very detailed in the information they
provided, listing the dates and partners of multiple acts of adul-
tery. Other petitions were very sparing in their descriptions of
adultery and cruelty. These were possibly instances of collusive
petitions, and I noted them if they seemed unusually short on de-
tails.8 9 It did appear, however, that the likelihood of seeing exten-
sive details of the marital crimes declined over the nine-year pe-
riod, which may indicate that collusive divorces increased, or that
attorneys realized the court would not demand extensive detail in
the petitions, especially if the facts still required proof in hearings
or jury trials. Because the grounds for obtaining a divorce were
different for husbands and wives, some of the differences in the
petitions and outcomes may be simply the result of the different
legal rules. But assuming that some of the differences may be in-
dicative of the prevalence of adultery or violence, I have analyzed
the petition and docket data along numerous axes of gender, of-
fense, length of time to final order, success rate, class, length of
marriage, number of children, and instances of bigamy or deser-
tion.9 °
In the first three and one-third years, 1,005 petitions were
docketed, seeking divorce, judicial separation, restitution of con-
jugal rights, annulment, alimony, and legitimacy.9' The vast ma-
jority of the petitions sought either divorce or judicial separa-
tion-957 out of 1,005, or 95%-and were split relatively evenly
between wives and husbands; 459 by husbands and 498 by wives,
or roughly 46% by husbands and 50% by wives.92 The other 2%
89. Unfortunately, the data on court procedure, timing, type of hearings, and inci-
dence of uncontested or default actions must await a different article.
90. It is important to note that some of this data is available only from the petitions,
some only from the docket, and some from both. Not all of my axes of analysis are dis-
cussed in this article. I have postponed the study of the court's procedure for a later arti-
cle, though I have done the relevant analysis and collated the data.
91. See infra tbl. 3; see also supra text accompanying notes 83-84. This number repre-
sents all petitions filed during this time, except for the ninety-nine protection of property
orders. See infra tbl. 2.
92. See infra tbl. 3.
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were petitions for any of the other four causes of action and 2%
were cases in which I was unable to identify the cause of action
from the docket and/or petition.93 The vast majority of the peti-
tions filed by husbands were for divorce, rather than judicial
separation (443 divorces to sixteen judicial separations), while the
petitions filed by wives were more evenly divided (285 divorces to
213 judicial separations).9 4
See Table 3 in Appendix:
Number of Petitions Filed (1858-1861)
If we look at the petitions that span the nine-year period, the
numbers are similar. Out of 551 petitions-which is a sampling of
nearly one in every four petitions filed-the vast majority of peti-
tioners (93.4%) sought either divorce or judicial separation.95 The
split between husbands and wives was also similar-242 petitions
by husbands, or 43.9%, and 273 petitions by wives, or 49.5%.96
And the majority of petitions filed by husbands were for divorce
(234 for divorce and only eight for judicial separation), while
wives petitioned for divorce and judicial separation at more
nearly the same rate (148 for divorce and 125 for judicial separa-
tion).97 In only two years did women file more judicial separation
petitions than divorce petitions.98
See Table 4 in Appendix:
Number of Petitions Filed Minus Protective
Orders (1858-1866)
While adultery was the most common marital violation in the
petitions and docket, there were more charges from husbands of
adultery by wives than from wives by husbands at a time when
women were supposed to be living a private morality of chastity
93. See infra tbl. 2; supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
94. See infra tbl. 3.
95. See infra tbl. 4.
96. See infra tbl. 4.
97. See infra thl. 4.
98. See infra tbl. 4. Why a wife might choose a judicial separation over a divorce is an
interesting inquiry. Besides leaving her fewer options and in a more vulnerable position,
the separation would seem to offer little relief for women whose husbands had not de-
serted them. It was quicker and cheaper to obtain but there is no indication that it offered
better support. More importantly, although separated wives could own property as though
they were femes sole, there were other limitations arising out of coverture that might still
pertain. See infra discussion and notes 118-23, 132-34 and accompanying text. A formal
judicial separation, however, was better than a private separation or an informal separa-
tion. See 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 408-14 (providing Lord Lyndhurst's critique of
the state of a married but separated wife).
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and female passivity.99 Although there were overall more total
marital termination suits by wives than by husbands, the fact
that virtually all the ones brought by husbands were for their
wives' adultery gives us a skewed image of Victorian wives as a
rather adulterous lot.100 But these numbers should not lead us to
conclude that women were more adulterous than men. Husbands
had more options in dealing with a troublesome spouse than did
wives, for they could determine their wives' residency, could
commit them in an asylum, lock them in the house, or even desert
them if they were not compliant.'0 ' A few husbands, whose wives
did not commit adultery, did obtain judicial separations on the
grounds of their wives' cruelty, but these were rare.0 2 The
scarceness of separation actions by husbands likely indicates
men's greater facility in making informal arrangements within
difficult marriages that did not involve adultery.
While they had fewer informal options, wives also had greater
legal obstacles to overcome in their termination suits. Without an
aggravating factor of incest, cruelty, or desertion, or without the
adultery, a wife could only bring a judicial separation action.'
Adding to their difficulties, wives who had allowed their violent
99. See infra tbls. 6, 9, and 10. There was a tremendous amount of literature that con-
tributed to a social discourse of female chastity, modesty, temperance, purity, and passiv-
ity. See, e.g., STONE, THE FAMILY, supra note 37, at 673-77; Thomas DeQunicey, The
Household Wreck, 43 BLACKWOOD'S EDINBURGH MAG. 1, 5 (1838) (describing the heroine in
the following terms: "Every thought of artifice-of practiced effect-or of haughty preten-
sion, fled before the childlike innocence-the sweet feminine timidity-and the more than
cherub loveliness of that countenance, which yet in its lineaments was noble, whilst its
expression was purely gentle and confiding."); Female Influence: A Domestic Sketch, 5
TAIT'S EDINBURGH MAG. 668 (1838); T.H. Lister, The Rights and Condition of Women, 73
EDINBURGH REV. 99, 100 (1841) (stating that "the peculiar office of man is to govern and
defend society, that of woman is to spread virtue, effection, and gentleness through it.");
John Neal, Men and Women, 16 BLACKWOOD'S EDINBURGH MAG. 387 (1824); The "Non-
Existence" of Women, 23 N. BRIT. REV. 536 (1855).
100. See infra tbl. 10. The character of the adultery differed by gender, however, as pe-
titions by wives who requested a divorce or judicial separation for adultery charged their
husbands with repeated acts of adultery, many of them over a multi-year period, with
multiple partners or prostitutes, and a depressing number included an allegation that the
husband had given the wife venereal disease. There were very few petitions that alleged
just a single act of adultery. Petitions by husbands, on the other hand, usually alleged
multiple acts of adultery with a single, named person, and often noted that the wife had
deserted her home to live with her new paramour, had borne children by him, or come to
the marriage with illegitimate children.
101. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *441-46 (comparing the rights of husbands and
wives in English marriage). Because husbands had control over support and domicile, they
could force misbehaving wives into mending their ways much easier than wives could in-
fluence husbands. See id.
102. See infra tbl. 10.
103. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in Eng-
land, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XVIII (1857) (Eng.).
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or adulterous husbands back in the house after a marital infrac-
tion would lose their grounds for termination because they would
be held to have condoned the misbehavior. °4 Because it was more
difficult for women to prove the grounds necessary for a divorce,
and because women were encouraged by families to forgive and
forget, the defense of condonation was likely to work more
harshly in petitions brought by wives than by husbands. Thus,
many wives who might have been victims of both adultery and
cruelty might only be able to prove one or the other because of
strict application of the rules of condonation. The amount of adul-
tery, therefore, is likely to be underrepresented in the data.10
Besides examining the gender of the petitioners, we need to
compare the number and character of women's divorce actions to
their judicial separation actions. Given the legislature's belief
that women were too passive to assert their rights in great num-
bers in a court of law, and the stereotypes of female passivity that
filled the literature of the day, the high percentage of divorce ac-
tions suggests that women were actually quite interested in clean
breaks with the opportunity to remarry.1"6 More than half of the
104. ALBERT GIBSON & ARTHUR WELDON, GIBSON & WELDON'S STUDENT'S PROBATE,
DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY 145-46 (1887); see also STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2,
at 206-07. Condonation sometimes operated quite harshly, so that a husband who stayed
out most of the night with his mistress, but came home in time to fall asleep for a couple of
hours, could plead condonation if his wife did not oust him from the home the moment he
stepped over the threshold. GIBSON & WELDON, supra, at 145-46. Allowing him to resume
habitation, no matter how briefly, was held to be a successful bar to her divorce or judicial
separation action. Id. Although condonation required proof of a full knowledge of the of-
fense and the deliberate forgiveness of it, Gibson and Weldon note that "the first fact being
established, the forgiveness is generally evidenced by a receiving back of the guilty party
into cohabitation." Id.
105. The effect of this underrepresentation is likely to be significantly higher for wives
than for husbands. The expectations in many middle and upper-class circles was that a
wife who was going to commit adultery would need to run off with her lover and never re-
turn home, adding desertion to the charge as well. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra
note 2, at 141-43. In many cases, husbands often did not have an opportunity to condone
the adultery. Husbands, on the other hand, routinely visited prostitutes or beat their
wives with no expectation of deserting their home. Unless a wife had a place to go, she
would most likely be forced to remain at home and thus held to have condoned. She would
be expected to leave her home and perhaps her children in order to defeat a defense of
condonation. While much of this is based on the literature of the period, novels as well as
diaries and political tracts, it also corresponds to the claims made in the petitions. Hus-
bands were overwhelmingly more likely to state that their wife had run off a few months
earlier with her lover. Wives were more likely to state that their husbands had visited
prostitutes or obtained a mistress, but that he returned home periodically to tend to his
affairs.
106. The standard history tells us that women really did not want to legally separate
from their husbands; instead they wanted their husbands to behave themselves. Consider
Elizabeth Packard and Caroline Norton's claims that they did not want to be divorced
wives, whom they perceived as forlorn victims of male oppression who existed in a state
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women who sought termination of their marriages had the
grounds for a full divorce and pursued it despite the higher cost
associated with divorce, greater evidentiary challenge, and longer
delay.'0 v Because the only real difference between divorce and ju-
dicial separation was the right to remarry, these numbers are
striking in at least two ways. First, the fact that over half of the
wives seeking marital termination met the elevated standard of
aggravated adultery and were thus deserving of a full divorce
goes against the lawmakers' expectations that divorces would be
sought only in extremely rare circumstances.' 8 Instead of the
rare four to five cases per year, nearly one divorce action every
four days was filed alleging aggravated adultery.0 9 Second, given
the social stigma of divorce and the financial independence re-
quired of separated women,"' the fact that women brought more
termination actions than men suggests that their married lives
were miserable enough to make them willing to take on that chal-
lenge. Women who went to court and asserted their legal rights to
terminate their marriage did so with more determination and
against greater odds than the men who sought out the court's
help.
B. Success Rate
Of the four primary marital termination categories-divorce by
husbands and wives and judicial separations by husbands and
wives"'-surprisingly, the highest success rate was for wives in
outside social and legal legitimacy. Dirk Hartog explains how Elizabeth Packard did not
want to be a divorced woman; she wanted to be married to a husband who did his duty
and protected his wife. Hendrik Hartog, Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 79, 96 (1988). Caroline Norton felt the same way, wanting the law to make her
husband behave, not grant her the power to leave him. Norton says "[miasculine superior-
ity is incontestable; and with the superiority should come protection .... Women... have
a right- founded on nature, equity, and religion-to the protection of man." NORTON,
CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE, supra note 7, at 165.
107. In the first two years, divorces could be granted only by the full court, which met
only quarterly, cost more, and generally took three to four months longer than separation
cases heard before Sir Cresswell alone. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § X (Eng.).
108. 146 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 207.
109. See infra tbl. 3 showing eighty-seven divorce petitions by wives filed in 1858, sev-
enty-four in 1859, etc.
110. Although entitled to support if she won, only about one in ten divorced wives re-
ceived a support order, and at least 10% of these required further enforcement orders. See
infra tbls. 20, 21; see also LAWRENCE STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS (1995) [hereinafter
STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS] (describing the hardships facing women who terminated mar-
riage) and STONE, BROKEN LIVES, supra note 2, at 35-40.
111. See An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in
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divorce, even though it was the most difficult cause of action to
prove. At the same time, women's success rate in judicial separa-
tions was the lowest, even though it should have been one of the
easiest to prove. From the court docket, we see that 278 divorces
were granted for husbands, out of 441 filed (63%). For wives, 200
divorces were granted, out of 284 filed (70%). But for judicial
separations, husbands were granted theirs 58.8% of the time,
while wives were granted theirs only 40% of the time. If judicial
separations were easier and cheaper to obtain, one would think
that women would get them at a higher rate than divorce if their
evidence of marital fault was weak or they had limited financial
resources. That wives generally obtained fewer judicial separa-
tions than divorces and had a much lower success rate in that ac-
tion suggests that women sought the greatest relief they could ob-
tain and that at divorce their evidence of fault was quite strong.
It also suggests that women's rate of non-continuance was not
caused by any overt hostility from the court; rather, that outside
influences-either family pressure, finances, or a private settle-
ment-were at work.
See Table 5 in Appendix:
Outcomes of Petitions Filed (Docket: 1858-1861)
From a purely financial perspective, some of these gender-
based distinctions make sense. A husband who obtained a divorce
for his wife's adultery would be relieved entirely of supporting
her. If he obtained only a judicial separation, he might still have
to provide support because she could not remarry and obtain a
new husband who would be legally bound to support her. Thus, if
his wife committed adultery, a husband had every incentive to ob-
tain a full divorce rather than settle for a judicial separation in
order to be entirely free of his dependent wife, and the petitions
reflect such incentive (443 divorces to sixteen separations). A
wife, on the other hand, who was successful in either her separa-
tion or divorce action would be legally entitled to some form of fi-
nancial support, even if it was not always requested."2 There
would be little property-based incentive to seek divorce over sepa-
ration, especially since in neither did the court express much con-
cern for wives' property rights."3 While a divorce might yield a
England, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § VI (1857) (Eng.).
112. See infra Part VII.C. (discussing alimony).
113. By the statute, a wife was entitled to permanent alimony in a separation action,
and to a property settlement-a gross sum of money or annual sum of money- or alimony
in a case of dissolution. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, §§ XVII, XXXII (Eng.). It is not entirely clear
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one-time property payment or an annual settlement for a specific
monetary amount, which would be enforceable in court, 14 ali-
mony orders and property settlements were granted in fewer
than 20% of petitions by wives."
The number of judicial separation petitions filed by wives that
were not continued deserves more attention and research. Forty-
four percent of judicial separation actions brought by wives were
not continued, compared to 17.6% of judicial separation actions
brought by husbands that were not continued." 6 There are a
number of possible explanations for this. Lawrence Stone believed
that wives were most likely to file a separation or divorce petition
solely for the purpose of blackmailing husbands into property set-
tlements, alimony, or private separation deeds." 7 If failure to con-
tinue prosecuting a suit indicates some ulterior motive, then
Stone may be right. However, my analysis reveals that there
were a sizable number of petitions filed by wives that were refiled
as different causes of action-usually a shift from a judicial sepa-
ration to a divorce-which may indicate that additional evidence
of adultery was obtained after the parties separated."" Also,
many petitions were refiled presumably after correcting certain
what the difference was, though two factors made the property settlement less advanta-
geous. Between 1858 and 1860, the court did not have the power to make settlement or-
ders affecting property settled on the parties before their marriage. Thus, the resources
which the court had power to settle on the wife were limited. Also, in 1861, Sir Cresswell
held that a property settlement should be smaller than alimony in order to dissuade
women from seeking dissolution of their marriage. Fisher v. Fisher, 2 Sw. & Tr. 410, 413
(1861).
114. While the law provided that husbands who were separated from their wives had to
continue to support them, the level of support was left primarily to the discretion of the
husband unless permanent alimony was ordered. And although a divorced wife had a right
to a specific sum through a property settlement-it would seem that wives would prefer
such an outcome-the surprisingly low number of alimony and settlement requests by
wives, in addition to the high number of writs of attachment that were necessary to en-
force compliance with alimony orders by husbands, calls into question drawing any con-
clusions about whether divorce or separation was preferred by wives based on the finan-
cial benefits of either.
115. For a discussion of property settlements and alimony, see infra Parts VII.B. and
VII.C. See also infra tbl. 21.
116. A small percent-less than 1% over all petitions-were abandoned because of
death by one party or the other, which was noted by the court. Certainly, death may have
occurred and the court may not have been notified, but we cannot know how often that
occurred.
117. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 183.
118. While few cases involved changing the grounds during the suit, there was a great
fear by wives who obtained a judicial separation on the grounds of their husbands' adul-
tery or cruelty, that if they later took up habitation with another man, their husband
could return and petition for a full divorce on the grounds of their adultery. This essen-
tially condemned separated wives to celibacy unless they were willing to lose the financial
support of their former husbands. See id. at 169.
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pleading errors or successfully being able to serve notice. Thus,
the 44% number may be somewhat high when we take account of
refiled petitions. Most likely, the difference indicates a lack of
economic means to continue the suit, inexperience by lawyers for
wives, the pressure on wives from family to reconcile or not to go
public, or the time wives may have required before coming to
terms with the permanence of a final break."9 To the extent
women are socialized into negotiating peaceful compromises and
solutions to disagreements, the willingness to discontinue a suit
may indicate a preference for informal resolutions of marital dif-
ficulties. 2 ° At the same time, filing the petition is often the most
emotionally and financially difficult step for a mistreated wife,
and can lead to harsh retribution from a violent husband.' 2 ' We
should not hastily attribute the 44% of judicial separation actions
that were not continued to pecuniary motives of blackmail, espe-
cially in light of the danger women face filing the petition and the
high success rate women generally experienced in the new court.
Without knowing more about their economic means, family pres-
sures to reconcile, the number of private separations that oc-
curred, and the likelihood of obtaining more favorable settlement
terms from their "blackmail," I hesitate to attribute the high
abandonment rate to any single cause.
Given the relative fluidity of working class society, and the pri-
vacy aspirations of the middle class, failure to continue a separa-
tion probably indicates that another form of termination oc-
curred, rather than reconciliation. 22 In a few cases, both husband
119. Hendrik Hartog tells the story of Abigail Bailey, an American wife in the late
1700s, who took a long time coming to accept the fact that she would have to divorce her
husband who had sexually abused their eldest daughter. See Hendrik Hartog, Abigail Bai-
ley's Coverture: Law in a Married Woman's Consciousness, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 63
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993) [hereinafter Hartog, Abigail Bailey's Cover-
ture]. Given the social stigma of divorce, it is not surprising that many wives would not
enter into the process quickly or decidedly. Id. at 99; see also Hendrik Hartog, Abigail Bai-
ley's Divorce, in MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 40 (2000) [hereinafter Hartog, Abigail Bailey's
Divorce]. Caroline Norton also waited many years, listening to her family's pleas for pa-
tience, before she permanently left her abusive husband. See NORTON, CAROLINE
NORTON'S DEFENSE, supra note 7, at 31-41; Bailey, supra note 30, at 404.
120. Hartog, Abigail Bailey's Coverture, supra note 119, at 99.
121. Studies suggest that the greatest threat women face from abusive husbands is
when they seek to leave the marriage, violence that is often triggered by the service of
process on the husband. See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 23, at 495-510; Mahoney, su-
pra note 23.
122. From evidence in diaries, novels, and biographies, permanent reconciliation seems
very rare. On the other hand, a kind of peaceful-or not so peaceful-non-interference may
have arisen in many marriages in which each allowed the other to form new relationships
or take up new abodes without turning to the law for redress. Caroline and George Norton,
George and Emily Westmeath, and Nelly and Aaron Stock all lived separate and apart,
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and wife filed petitions and the parties apparently agreed to pur-
sue one, leaving the other to languish, or the court consolidated
them and granted one while dismissing the other. Of the twelve
cases that involved petitions filed by both spouses, two-thirds
(eight) were not continued by the wife, while the husband's suit
progressed to a final order of dissolution. 123 Of the petitions for
judicial separation by wives that were not continued, roughly 14%
involved an allegation of desertion, indicating that informal sepa-
ration occurred and the wife sought formal resolution of the pre-
existing status quo.'
24
One likely form of non-judicial resolution to these abandoned
cases would be desertion, usually, by the husbands 125 or, in the
middle and upper classes, a private separation agreement negoti-
ated with all the limitations and disadvantages of informal at-
tempts to bargain around coverture' 26 Private separation agree-
ments are harder to account for because the point of these
agreements was to renegotiate marital breakdown outside of the
courts and the public eye. There are few records on the total
number of these agreements that existed. Susan Staves and Law-
rence Stone have both examined the private separation agree-
ments and found that they were a favorite of the middle and up-
per classes who dreaded the gossip and scandal associated with
public divorce actions.'27 They also were far more common
though none could be said to be peaceful with continuing lawsuits, fights over children,
and publication of each others' grievances in pamphlets and newspapers. See NORTON,
CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE, supra note 7; 1 NELLY WEETON, MISS WEETON: JOURNAL
OF A GOVERNESS (Edward Hall, ed., 1936). See generally NUGENT, WESTMEATH, supra note
7. But couples did live separately in novels, particularly in novels dealing with the aristoc-
racy, which often blurred the line between marital separation and each just going about
his or her own business. See, e.g., ANNE BRONTE, THE TENANT OF WILDFELL HALL (Ernest
Rhys, ed., J.M. Dent & Sons); MARGARET OLIPHANT, THE MARRIAGE OF ELINOR (London,
MacMillan 1982) [hereinafter OLIPHANT, MARRIAGE OF ELINOR]; EMMA D.E.N.
SOUTHWORTH, ISHMAEL: OR IN THE DEPTHS (New York, A.L. Burt Co. 1826); ANTHONY
TROLLOPE, HE KNEW HE WAS RIGHT (New York, Harper & Bros. 1869).
123. Of the twelve cases, eight resulted in the husband obtaining a divorce and the
wife's suit being dismissed or not continued; three resulted in the wife's suit being granted
and the husband's dismissed or not continued; and one resulted in both petitions being
dismissed.
124. See infra tbl. 6.
125. A remarkable number of husbands seemed to have participated in the mass emi-
gration to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand during the middle of the cen-
tury.
126. See Susan Staves, Separate Maintenance Contracts, in 11 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
LIFE 78 (Nov. 1987) [hereinafter Staves, Separate Maintenance Contracts]; Tammy Moore,
Common Sense and Common Practice, Custody Provisions in Deeds of Separation: Eng-
land 1705-1873 (2002) (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of New Brunswick) (on
file with the author).
127. See Staves, Separate Maintenance Contracts, supra note 126, at 90; STONE, ROAD
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mechanisms for resolving marital disputes in the diaries and
novels of the period than court proceedings, which may indicate a
general social acceptance of these agreements within the literate
classes. 28 Moreover, enough agreements were eventually litigated
to suggest that a thriving market existed.129 But we have no way
of knowing what percentage of abandoned separation actions
were followed by formal separation agreements.
Failure to continue a private or a legal separation was prob-
lematic for both parties, however, and there would have been
great incentive to avoid such a fate. Unless they truly reconciled
and once more formed a harmonious domestic unit, these couples
would remain married, vulnerable to the property claims of the
other,13 while unable to legalize new relationships. Again, how-
TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 149-82; Moore, supra note 126, at 33.
128. Private deeds were used in the cases of George and Caroline Norton, George and
Emily Westmeath, and Nelly and Aaron Stock, supra note 122. In addition, the following
cases dealing with private deeds went to trial: Hope v. Hope, 43 Eng. Rep. 534 (1854); St.
John (Lord) v. St. John (Lady), 32 Eng. Rep. 1192 (1805); Swift v. Swift, 146 Rev. Rep. 524
(1865); and Vansittart v. Vansittart, 119 Rev. Rep. 109 (1858). We also see them in novels
by Anthony Trollope, Margaret Oliphant, and Elizabeth Gaskell. See supra note 122.
129. Lawrence Stone explains that
[bletween 1790 and 1830, an attempt was made by lords Kenyon and Eldon
and others not merely to reduce the scope of private separation deeds, but
even to abolish them altogether. However, their efforts generated a backlash.
Other conservatives were reluctant to overturn a century of case law, and re-
formers were anxious to meet a clear public need. As a result, private separa-
tion deeds were still flourishing when the new Divorce Court was set up in
1857, and even afterwards they continued to serve a useful purpose. In 1908
it was estimated that there were still 2,000 private separations a year, com-
pared with a mere 100 judicial separations.
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 181; see also Moore, supra note 126.
130. Husbands would have a continuing duty to support their wives and would be li-
able for their debts; wives would be vulnerable to their husbands' demands for access to
any property they had been able to put aside through their labor, or their children's labor.
Caroline Norton details the miseries of such women in her book, ENGLISH LAWS FOR
WOMEN. NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE, supra note 7.
To stand the brunt of a vile and indecent action at law, and afterwards reside
apart from her husband for ten, fifteen, twenty years,-with every human
circumstance, except death, that can put division between them,-does not
affect the legal fiction which assumes that a married couple are one. The
husband retains all his rights over her and her property. If he please, he can
bring an action for restitution of conjugal rights; and he may seize her even
by force .... He retains the right of bringing an action for divorce .... All
that belongs to the wife is the husband's-even her clothes and trinkets: that
is the law of England. Her earnings are his. The copyrights of [her] works are
his, by law.
That this is a desperate position for a woman to be in... are all incon-
trovertible truths. But it is also an incontrovertible truth that justice should
be made possible for her, even in this false position. That, failing her natural
protector, the law should have power to protect.
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ever, the positions of husbands and wives differed significantly,
especially in mobility and opportunity to enter new romantic rela-
tionships. In cases of adultery by a wife, she might very often
move in with her lover, leaving the husband, with his earning po-
tential, alone and available to form a new relationship and a new
family. Even if his suit was not continued, the likelihood that the
wife's future debts would be paid by the new lover was high, and
the husband could hopefully find a replacement for his wife's ser-
vices. But the reverse was not true. Most wives were not finan-
cially independent, and if their husbands left to take up habita-
tion with a mistress, they could not easily find a replacement
without moving out of their communities, possibly committing
bigamy, or remaining and committing adultery themselves-
thereby becoming vulnerable to a divorce action by their hus-
bands. Because women generally did not have the financial and
social independence to form new attachments or relocate, being a
married woman without a husband or a formal legal termination
meant these women were probably relegated to future celibacy
and dependence on their families, as well as continuing legal non-
existence under the laws of coverture.' 3 ' And while this may have
been a choice for some women who wanted to avoid the publicity
at all costs, it is hard to imagine that many women would will-
ingly begin a very difficult and controversial process, file the peti-
tion and make a public record, and then discreetly disappear back
into obscurity without any legal protection or resolution.'32
C. Marital Faults
Because husbands sued almost exclusively on the ground of
adultery, patterns and differences in marital fault manifest them-
selves most in the cases brought by wives. Of the grounds for the
termination actions brought by wives-adultery, cruelty,
NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE, supra note 7, at 156-57, 161-62.
131. For women who started businesses, the disabilities of coverture were a real hin-
drance to their ability to enter into contracts, except perhaps in London which by custom
had allowed married women to enter into contracts regarding their separately-owned
businesses. See BAKER, supra note 66, at 484; Beard v. Webb, 126 Eng. Rep. 1175 (1800);
see also NORTON, LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 7, at 57-58 (discussing "the Woman's
Divorce" as "leave and remain ALONE").
132. See, e.g., OLIPHANT, MARRIAGE OF ELINOR, supra note 122. The married couple
separated shortly after the birth of their only son. Id. The mother moved to a secluded
house and devoted herself to raising her son, forsaking all other romantic relationships
herself, just to be away from her husband. Id. The husband, on the other hand, frequently
had affairs, socialized in all the proper circles in London and Paris, and was not tied down
by any expenses from his wife, because she was being supported by her aged mother and
her annuity. Id.; see also TOSH, supra note 37; STONE, BROKEN LIVES, supra note 2.
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desertion, bigamy, incest, or combinations thereof[3-which I cor-
related to success rate, adultery combined with cruelty was the
most popular ground-eighty petitions alleged adultery and cru-
elty with success in forty-eight (60%) over all causes of action-
divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, and
annulment. 3 1 Sixty-four of those eighty were in petitions for di-
vorce while only twelve were in petitions for judicial separation.135
The success rate for the divorce actions alone was 67%.' Cruelty
alone was the next most popular ground-sixty-one-with success
in only seventeen cases (28%).13' Not surprisingly, most of those
were in petitions for judicial separation (fifty-six) and the success
rate there was less than 27%.13' The third most popular combina-
tion of grounds was adultery mixed with desertion, which com-
prised fifty of the petitions and had a success rate of 76%.131 Most
of those were in divorce actions (forty) with a success rate for the
divorces of nearly 88%.14 ° Such a high success rate for divorces
involving desertion would seem rather odd since these were pre-
sumably uncontested divorces with many involving husbands who
were out of the country and therefore unamenable to service and
notice. For those petitions alleging only adultery, thirty out of
thirty-five were in judicial separation petitions, and they had a
success rate of 43%. 141
See Table 6 in Appendix:
Grounds for Marital Termination (Wives only)
Not surprisingly, adultery combined with cruelty or desertion
was the most frequent grounds for divorce, while adultery or cru-
elty alone were the most frequent grounds for judicial separa-
133. I analyzed only the wives for this table because husbands are so consistent. All the
divorce petitions allege adultery, though some added desertion as well. But wives had a
variety of grounds on which to base their petitions, and we see a notable pattern in the
success rate of these.
134. See infra tbl. 6. These are for cases in which the wife alleged adultery and cruelty
and asked for any of the four major remedies: divorce, judicial separation, restitution of
conjugal rights, or annulment.
135. See infra tbl. 6.
136. See infra tbl. 6. Ironically, one would imagine judicial separation actions alleging
adultery and cruelty would have a very high success rate, but in fact, they had a lower
success rate than overall actions alleging adultery and cruelty.
137. See infra tbl. 6.
138. See infra tbl. 6.
139. See infra tbl. 6.
140. See infra tbl. 6.
141. See infra tbl. 6.
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tion. 4 1 Ironically, judicial separation petitions alleging cruelty
had only a 27% success rate while judicial separation petitions al-
leging adultery alone had a 43% success rate, the difference being
primarily in the numbers of petitions alleging cruelty that were
not continued-63% not continued alleging cruelty, compared to
47% not continued alleging adultery.43 Was cruelty harder to
prove or was the court more sympathetic to women's claims of
adultery? Further comparisons need to be done to see if there ex-
ists any class-based explanations for this difference.
Obviously, no petition asking for a divorce and alleging adul-
tery would be granted, though oddly two petitions asking for a di-
vorce and alleging cruelty alone were apparently granted."4 Per-
haps most significant is that adultery was at least one ground in
193 petitions, while cruelty was at least one ground in 170 peti-
tions. 45 The only other ground that even begins to approach these
two is desertion, which was alleged in ninety-eight petitions.'46
Bigamy was alleged in eight petitions, incest in three, sodomy in
three, impotence in two, and ouster in eight.'47 What this tells us
about the prevalence of adultery and cruelty in these women's
lives is important. Even though adultery with cruelty was the
most common grounds alleged for a divorce, and cruelty was the
most common ground for a judicial separation, adultery predomi-
nated overall in these petitions.'14
Wives who could allege adultery also were more likely to be
successful than wives who alleged cruelty. 149 Oddly, however,
adultery by the husband, which was excused and even condoned
in much of the literature of the period, was more indicative of a
wife's success in a divorce than cruelty, which was universally
denounced in that same literature.'5 ° The prevalence of adultery
certainly implies that it was a widespread practice by Victorian
husbands who were in marriages that ultimately broke down and
142. See infra tbl. 6.
143. See infra tbl. 6.
144. See infra tbl. 6. It may have been that the petitions were amended to add a ground
and the docket failed to report it.
145. See infra tbl. 6.
146. See infra tbl. 6.
147. See infra tbl. 6.
148. See infra tbl. 6.
149. See infra tbl. 6. One hundred eighteen petitions were granted to wives claiming
adultery out of 193 (61%), while eighty-five petitions were granted to wives claiming cru-
elty out of 170 (50%).
150. See, e.g., 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 406; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra
note 2, at 198-206; The "Non-Existence" of Women, supra note 99; Lister, supra note 99.
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it is a requisite to a divorce petition. This does not mean that Vic-
torian husbands were more adulterous than husbands of other
periods, but it does suggest that wives who wanted to get a favor-
able hearing were more likely to do so with an allegation of adul-
tery than of cruelty or desertion.
Perhaps most tragic is the number of women who alleged, as
part of both adultery and cruelty, that their husbands had given
them venereal disease. Of 551 petitions filed by both husbands
and wives, twenty-two wives claimed their husbands gave them
venereal disease while only two husbands claimed their wives in-
fected them. 1 ' This works out to nearly 10% of wives who were
infected by their husbands (twenty-two out of 264) while less than
1% of husbands were infected by their wives." 2 To the extent Sir
Cresswell was sympathetic to the wife of an adulterous husband,
this allegation would seem to be a powerful tool in her arsenal,
and in fact twelve of the twenty-two cases alleging venereal dis-
ease resulted in granting the wife's petition, while seven were not
continued and three were dismissed. 153 However, assuming the
allegations were true,5 one must wonder what happened to the
nearly half of these women who were not successful.
Although these numbers cannot tell us how many women faced
violence or adultery in the home, they are remarkable for show-
ing that adultery, as a marital fault, received more favorable
treatment by the court than cruelty. This makes some sense, as
adultery traditionally has been deemed the ultimate violation of
the marriage vow.155 Yet, if the culture of the period supported
male sexual freedom and female sexual restraint, we would not
expect women's divorce claims to be more successful than men's
unless the typical charge of cruelty tipped the scale. 5 6 But, to the
151. This is information obtained from the data examined in tbl. 4.
152. See infra tbl. 4.
153. This success rate corresponds to the rate at which divorces for adultery and cru-
elty and judicial separations for adultery were granted. The average length of marriage for
these women was twelve years and nearly half, ten, had no children. To the extent that
long, childless marriages are more likely to involve adultery, that stereotype is supported
by the data, though whether the adultery was motivated by loneliness or by a feeling that
she has little to lose cannot be definitively identified here.
154. I am likely to believe the truth of these claims given the embarrassment of con-
fessing such an affliction.
155. 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 416; 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1981;
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *441.
156. See Shanley, "One Must Ride Behind," supra note 2, at 364-67 (discussing the Vic-
torian expectation of female sexual passivity and male sexual license); see also JUDITH
WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY: WOMEN, CLASS AND THE STATE 70
(1980); Nancy Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-
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extent violence and cruelty were deemed a part of Victorian daily
life, we would expect claims of cruelty to be heavily scrutinized
before providing the aggravating circumstances necessary for a
wife's successful divorce. What the data shows, however, is that a
significant number of wives who could only prove cruelty, failed
to continue their suits and probably left their. homes, emigrated,
or moved in with new partners as nonlegal solutions to marital
breakdown. And those women who did not have the flexibility or
resources to simply leave, petitioned for marital termination from
what appeared to be a position of immediate need." 7 Those
women with the least resources and the weakest claims received
little help from the court and may have often found themselves
worse off than before bringing suit because they angered their
violent husbands by filing and receiving no legal protection in re-
turn.
As part of its attempt to keep an eye on the divorce epidemic,
Parliament requested a return in 1859, and again in 1861, detail-
ing the dates of filing of divorce petitions and the dates of the
adultery alleged in the petitions. 158 According to that return, 50%
of the petitions involved acts of adultery occurring in the two
years immediately preceding the filing; another 23% were allega-
tions of adultery spanning longer than two years, but continuing
into and culminating in the immediately prior two years.' 59 A to-
tal of 26% of the cases involved allegations of adultery that had
occurred three or more years prior to filing the divorce petition,
and 5% of all petitions alleged adultery that had occurred more
1850, 4 SIGNS 220 (1978); Probert, supra note 2, at 76-79.
157. See infra tbl. 15; see also infra Part VII.A. In contrast, 64% of wives seeking a pro-
tective order for property had been deserted for longer than five years. The prevalence of
relatively recent cruelty and adultery and older desertion allegations indicates that the
majority of wives who sought termination had only temporarily escaped their intolerable
home lives. But the minority of couples who complained of old abuses and the majority of
wives seeking protective orders were most likely seeking to regularize a new relationship
that had come into being after an earlier separation.
158. Parliament was concerned with whether the availability of civil divorce would en-
courage acts of adultery. Thus, the lawmakers were concerned with determining whether
the acts complained of had occurred before or after passage of the law on August 28, 1857.
The returns showed that 344 of the cases involved adultery occurring after the law was
passed and 437 cases involving prior adultery. See "Returns of the Number of Causes for
Dissolutions of Marriages filed in the Registry for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, the
Dates when they were filed, and the Dates when the alleged Acts of Adultery were com-
mitted: . . ." dated 6 July 1859, in ROYAL COMMISSION ON DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 119-
32; "Returns," dated 21 August 1860, id. at 167-78; "Returns," dated 31 July 1861, id. at
181-200.
159. See infra tbl. 7.
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than ten years in the past. 160 These numbers indicate that, for
nearly three-fourths of the petitioners-both husbands and
wives-a relatively recent adulterous event most likely precipi-
tated the lawsuit. With regard to judicial separations, 77% of
those alleging adultery involved acts within the previous two
years, with 6% alleging acts older than ten years. 6' The fact that
most of these petitioners faced relatively recent acts of adultery
suggests that these people wanted immediate relief, not a regu-
larization of a past separation, though the latter may be the
likely motive in up to 25% of cases. 62
See Table 7 in Appendix:
Length of Time Between Petition for Divorce and Al-
leged Act of Adultery (January 1858 to July 1861)
See Table 8 in Appendix:
Length of Time Between Petition for Judicial
Separation and Alleged Act of Adultery
(January 1858 to July 1861)
D. Marital Fault Over Time
To uncover a little more about the lives of these women, we
need to examine more closely how different marital faults related
to the life-course of an average marriage.63 When we compare the
marital faults, causes of action, success rates, and number of
children to the age of the marriage, we see different patterns
emerge. First, the majority of female petitioners clustered in the
middle range of length of marriage-averaging 13.3 years.
16 4
There were only eight out of 297 wives who had been married
over twenty-five years who sought divorce, compared to twenty
who sought a judicial separation. 165 On the other end of the scale,
twenty-five wives married less than five years sought divorces,
160. See infra tbl. 7.
161. See infra tbl. 8.
162. See infra tbl. 8.
163. Although my five-year breakdown for marriages does not correlate to more scien-
tific studies of the life-cycle of most marriages, it attempts a rough correspondence. Jack
Dominian has put forth a good study analyzing multiple causes of divorce and their effects
over time, despite being somewhat dated in its stereotypical examples of male and female
assumptions. See Jack Dominian, Families in Divorce, in FAMILIES IN BRITAIN 263 (Rap-
paport et. al. eds., 1982).
164. See infra tbl. 9.
165. See infra tbl. 9.
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compared to twenty-five who sought judicial separation.'66 And of
those married between five and fifteen years, seventy-seven
sought divorce, compared to forty-seven who sought judicial sepa-
ration.167 What is most interesting is not the prevalence of divorce
in the middle years or the prevalence of judicial separation in the
later years of marriage, but the high rate of judicial separation in
the youngest marriages-those women we would presume most
likely to remarry. The high numbers of judicial separation for all
women show that remarriage was not the number one priority for
nearly half of these wives.
See Table 9 in Appendix:
Wives: Length of Marriage, Grounds, and Success Rate
(1858-1866)
The alleged marital faults also changed as the marriage aged.
For women married less than fifteen years, the most common
marital fault alleged was adultery combined with cruelty (sixty-
eight), and the second most common fault was cruelty alone
(forty-six).16' For women at the later end of their marriages, the
most common faults alleged were desertion alone or desertion
mixed with adultery or cruelty (ten), followed closely by adultery
alone (nine).'69 For women married less than five years, desertion
was a ground in only six out of fifty-six petitions (11%).170 For
women married more than thirty years, desertion was a ground
in seven out of fourteen petitions (50%).17 And for women mar-
ried less than five years, adultery was a ground in at least
twenty-five petitions (45%), while for women married more than
thirty years adultery was a ground in five petitions (36%).172 A
rough summary shows that most young wives sought divorce or
separation on grounds of cruelty; that as the marriages aged,
adultery began to predominate; and at the end of marriage, de-
sertion predominated. While not surprising in terms of our mod-
ern expectations of the way marriages age, 7' what is important is
166. See infra tbl. 9.
167. See infra tbl. 10.
168. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for details on marital faults allowed un-
der the statute. See also infra tbl. 9.
169. See infra thl. 9. Women married twenty-five years or longer fall into this category.
170. See infra tbl. 9.
171. See infra tbl. 9.
172. See infra tbl. 9.
173. The common myth about the "seven-year itch" supports the idea that spouses are
likely to commit adultery in waves, with the majority occurring in the middle stages of
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that a substantial minority of cases in all age groups fell outside
this pattern. Furthermore, the requirement of aggravated adul-
tery for divorce meant women had to prove two separate marital
faults, and it is unclear from the petitions which of the two would
be the dominant complaint.174
We also see an interesting pattern in the success rate of these
women's petitions. For women married less than ten years and
more than twenty-five years, more petitions were not continued
than were granted. 7 ' But in the middle range of marriage length,
between ten and twenty-five years, the number of petitions
granted far exceeded the number not continued--eighty petitions
were granted and forty-one were not continued.'76 These patterns
suggest that women in the middle of their marriages, between ten
and twenty years of marriage, were more likely to request a di-
vorce than a judicial separation, and were most likely to pursue it
to a final order-with a 58% success rate."77 What is surprising,
however, is that younger women, who had been married less than
five years, did not seek divorce at a greater rate than judicial
separation, and they had a lower success rate (43%).178 And
women at the late end of their marriages had the lowest success
rate (31%), even though they were most likely to ask only for a
judicial separation rather than a divorce. 7 9
While the foregoing numbers may not seem particularly un-
usual or diverse, there were important differences in the types of
relief and the success rates for wives at different stages of their
marriages. The average number of children, not surprisingly, in-
creased with length of marriage. What is most odd, perhaps, is
the high number of separation actions filed by young wives who,
one would imagine, would think seriously about remarriage, es-
marriage. Cruelty and violence, however, do not tend to fit any such pattern. See MARGA-
RET BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE
FAMILY 96 (2000).
174. In many petitions by wives, there would be a long list of adultery, followed by a
single instance of violence or vice versa. Where they were so obvious, I noted them; but the
vast majority listed one or two instances of adultery or cruelty and/or a date of desertion,
and it is impossible to tell which action most precipitated the lawsuit.
175. At the earlier end of marriage, fifty-seven petitions were not continued, whereas
fifty-two were granted. Conversely, at the later end of marriage, fifteen petitions were not
continued, whereas ten were granted. See infra tbl. 9.
176. See infra tbl. 9.
177. See infra tbl. 9.
178. See infra tbl. 9.
179. See infra tbl. 9.
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pecially since nearly half did not have children. 8 ° Their failure to
ask for a divorce may be indicative of not having met the more
stringent criteria of aggravated adultery, or of having some aver-
sion to a full divorce. But we cannot assume the same factors
influenced the predominance of separations at the later stages of
marriage. Young women may have been idealistic and so did not
imagine remarriage. Or, they may have been quicker to terminate
their marriages on weaker grounds than their older sisters.''
Neither of these positions explains the separation rate for older
marriages, which also had the lowest success rate. These latter
are the women we would assume to have a lifetime of marital
faults to present to the court and the resources to complete their
suits. Yet, their success rate was the lowest of any marital termi-
nation action by wives before the court."8 2 Women in the middle
range of marriage were most likely to request a divorce and most
likely to get it; yet, these women also would seem the most vul-
nerable to social and economic forces. Their parents were likely to
be dead or elderly, so they could not go home to parents when
their marriages fell apart, as younger wives might.8 3 At the same
time, they would not have amassed life savings through inheri-
tances or work that would provide them with the financial secu-
rity to risk life without a male breadwinner, which their older sis-
ters might do. Moreover, they would be likely to have children
who would be a financial drain.'84 We can speculate along many
lines, but in the end we must realize that each woman brought
her own experiences and her own ambitions to the court.
Seeing these very significant differences in the grounds and
causes of action for women as their marriages aged raises difficult
180. See infra tbl. 9.
181. In the alternative, they may have been more successful in using termination ac-
tions to get their husbands to behave, after which they truly reconciled.
182. Such modern factors as battered women's syndrome may also be a factor, as well
as the fact that older women may have achieved a relative stability and independence, and
thus rarely chose to upset the status quo.
183. While abused wives could, perhaps, go to the homes of their siblings or parents,
long-term living situations with siblings were more difficult than with parents, especially
if the parents were aged and needed the assistance of these now-single daughters. These
expectations played into the common assumption that the eldest daughter would remain
single in order to remain in the parents' home. See generally LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATH-
ERINE HALL, FAMILY FORTUNES: MEN AND WOMEN OF THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS, 1780-
1850, at 347 (1987); STONE, THE FAMILY, supra note 37, at 380-86; MARTHA VICINUS, IN-
DEPENDENT WOMEN: WORK AND COMMUNITY FOR SINGLE WOMEN, 1850-1920, at 10-45
(1985).
184. Because these were mostly middle-class women, their children were most likely
financial drains rather than assets. See, e.g., DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 183, at 343-
48; TOSH, supra note 37, at 156.
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questions about the effect of the adultery double-standard on dif-
ferent women over time. Were young wives more or less ham-
pered by the requirement of aggravated adultery than older
wives? Or, are the patterns more likely caused by psycho-social
differences? In 1858, wives married twenty-five to thirty years
were of a very different generation than wives married less than
five years. Did the older women's lifetime under a regime in
which divorce was simply unavailable for women affect their will-
ingness to go to court after 1858? Or, were they the women who
fought for equal legal rights? Were the young wives naive and op-
timistic, or were they the harbingers of an enlightened genera-
tion? And were the middle-range wives desperate, pragmatic, re-
sourceful, or exasperated victims of male sexual license and
violence?
Breaking the petitions down over time shows how important it
is to study legal reform within its social context. The new divorce
law, which is easy to criticize from an abstract perspective, and
which historians have analyzed with a rather broad brush, may
have had very little---or very great-impact on a particular
woman's decision to terminate her marriage. Unpacking the rela-
tionship between legal constraints and a woman's choice to ter-
minate her marriage must wait, however, for the purposes of this
article is to continue to make the questions more complex by fur-
ther breaking down the data to examine how custody, property,
and class also intersect with gender and age.
E. Husbands
Although there are fewer patterns to be discerned with regard
to husbands, they did tend to seek termination slightly earlier in
their marriages than wives." 5 There were more petitions from
husbands married between five and ten years than any other;
with men married ten to fifteen years following closely behind. 8
Moreover, husbands married less than five years had the highest
number of other causes of action-namely, restitution of conjugal
rights and annulments-than any other age group, perhaps indi-
cating an aversion to outright divorce in a relatively young mar-
riage."l 7 The highest success rate for husbands' divorces occurred
in the twenty-five to thirty year marriage range (70%, which was
185. See infra tbl. 10.
186. See infra tbl. 10.
187. See infra tbl. 10.
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the range with the lowest success rate for women), but there were
very few divorces in that category.38 The next highest success
rate corresponds to the range with the highest number of peti-
tions-five to ten years-with a success rate of 68%."89 As mar-
riages aged, the success rates generally declined, which may be
an indication that older men were hesitant to set aside their
wives;19° that older wives were less likely to stray; or that the
court would scrutinize carefully a husband's attempt to divorce a
wife of many years.'9 '
See Table 10 in Appendix:
Husbands, Length of Marriage, Grounds, and Children
(1858-1866)
Men in the first five years of marriage appear to have brought
more diverse claims, including restitution of conjugal rights, than
men married longer, which may indicate they made some attempt
to reconcile.'92 But after five years of marriage, they asked almost
exclusively for divorce and were successful between 60% and 70%
of the time.'93 Although the success rate did not differ greatly be-
tween men and women overall, a much higher percentage of
women than men did not continue their suits, while men had a
great percentage of their suits dismissed by the court.'9 4 As men-
tioned above, men's low rate of non-continuance, especially after
the first five years, can perhaps be explained by their: greater fi-
nancial independence; the incentives to get rid of an adulterous
wife so as not to have to support her debts; and men's overall
greater access to courts and lawyers.
A total of eight husbands filed for judicial separation on the
grounds of cruelty, and these cases were roughly as successful as
their divorces-five granted, two abandoned, and one dis-
missed.'95 Husbands also filed six annulment actions and three
actions for restitution of conjugal rights; none of the latter were
188. See infra tbl. 10; see also infra tbl. 9.
189. See infra tbl. 10.
190. Of course, this could be an internalized disinclination or, more likely, a social and
quasi-legal norm, the violation of which would call down on the husband's head significant
censure.
191. I have heard anecdotal evidence that courts have sometimes limited the ability of
older couples to get a divorce if doing so would cause great hardship. Hardship could be
understood as the stigma of divorce for an older, traditional woman.
192. See infra tbl. 10.
193. See infra tbl. 10.
194. See infra tbl. 10.
195. See infra tbl. 10.
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successful.196 Nearly 10%, or twenty-two, of their divorce actions
included desertion as a ground. 197 And a small handful of peti-
tions (five) indicated that a private separation deed preceded the
divorce petition. Typically, women who separated and did not re-
main celibate opened themselves to a divorce suit because the
private separation had no legal effect on the status of the mar-
riage, which continued to exist in the eyes of the law. Adultery af-
ter the separation could then serve as grounds for a full divorce
with a right to discontinue support.
There was also a notable difference in the increase for men and
women in filing termination actions between those married less
than five years and those married between five and ten years.198
The numbers of termination petitions nearly doubled for men, but
rose only about 15% for women.1 99 Men married from five to fif-
teen years filed nearly 54% of male termination petitions, while
women married between five and fifteen years filed only 44% of
female termination petitions. °° What we see, therefore, is a
greater rise and fall in petitions by husbands, and a much more
gradual curve in petitions by wives.
F. The Meaning of Divorce
One important question raised by this data is why women
sought the more difficult divorce at rates as high or higher than
judicial separations. While it would seem logical that if the only
difference between the two was that the divorce carried the right
to remarry, we might assume the women who had a choice sought
divorce because they hoped to remarry. But I do not believe that
such a straightforward interpretation can be made. Women who,
today, have a very difficult time remarrying-middle-aged women
with adolescent children-were the group most likely to choose a
divorce over a separation in the mid-nineteenth century.2 1 I be-
lieve the lack of correlation to alimony and custody shows that
196. See infra tbl. 10.
197. See infra tbl. 10.
198. See infra tbl. 10; see also infra tbl. 9.
199. See infra tbl. 10.
200. See infra tbl. 10. Ironically, male petitions tend to cluster in seven to ten-year in-
tervals, especially in the first fifteen years, confirming the old adage that marriages go
through cycles, though apparently it was the wives with the "seven-year itch," not the hus-
bands.
201. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 420 (noting that divorced women are
three times less likely to remarry than divorced men).
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these women were not bringing suit for some pretextual reason.
They asked for what they wanted, even if they did not always get
it. 202
Social, rather than legal, reasons may offer some possible ex-
planation for the differences. The older women's disinclination to
seek a divorce may be explained by reference to an older set of so-
cial norms stemming from an era when divorces were not as read-
ily available. °8 Somewhat younger women, who might have been
more accepting of the changing nature of divorce, may have been
more likely to seek a full divorce. But that does not explain the
disinclination of the youngest wives to seek divorce. To the extent
they were caught up in romantic notions of reconciliation or were
pressured by families, they may have eschewed the full divorce as
overstepping acceptable social norms. °4 These young wives also
may have had the least financial resources with which to prose-
cute a divorce action, and instead opted for an informal separa-
tion.05 Moreover, it does not appear from the data at this point
that a judicial separation was a common prelude to divorce, as
was customary in some states.0 6 While some petitioners filed
multiple petitions, they were usually within a short time of each
other, and the usual success of the last petition indicated flaws in
the pleadings more than an expectation that a separation would
precede a divorce.
In many ways, the data raises more questions than it answers.
By conceiving of marriage in stages and breaking down the
grounds, remedies, and success rate, we see that different women
seemed likely to have different goals when they went to court.
202. The lack of correlation is explained in infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
203. See Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in Nine-
teenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 651, 665 (2002) ("Until the mid-
nineteenth century in England, only an ecclesiastical court could grant a separation from
bed and board, and only Parliament could grant a full divorce.").
204. STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS, supra note 110, at 37 ("The overwhelming ideology of
female subordination and inferiority, drilled into every member of the society by clerical
sermons, state regulations, marital handbooks, and both 6lite and popular culture, in-
duced a certain docility in most wives, and thus reduced the tension level of the inevitable
power struggle within the household.").
205. See id. at 42; see also STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 159 (stating that
private separation "was also popular as a very cheap way of terminating all marriages").
206. In New York, for instance, there is technically no such thing as a "no-fault" di-
vorce. Couples must legally separate for one or more years before they are entitled to an
automatic default divorce. See N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 170 (1990) (listing fault
grounds and noting required separation periods); cf. 48 N.Y. JUR. 2D § 2084 (1995) (noting
that while New York has not authorized "no-fault divorces," courts granting divorces
based on a separation agreement do so on a "nonfault basis").
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Women were older or waited longer than men before seeking a
divorce, °7 and women's failure to continue a large percentage of
their suits suggest that multiple factors influenced or limited
their legal options.2 °8 Young wives who were most likely to have
family support networks brought almost as many separation ac-
tions as divorces, as did older wives who could live with their
children.2 °9 But the reasons motivating each were most likely to
differ. Women who seemed the least likely to have the resources
to petition for a divorce actually had the highest rate of divorces
with the most success.21 ° And women at an early stage of their
marriage, who might have thought of remarriage, had a divorce
rate and a success rate similar to that of their eldest sisters.211
Men, on the other hand, brought the majority of their termination
actions in mid-life, when they had the most financial flexibility
and yet retained significant chances of remarriage.212 These dif-
ferences suggest that it was not the legal double-standard, or
even the legal rules at all, that most influenced the choices of dif-
ferent groups of women. Numerous other social factors must be
examined before we can begin to understand the impact of the
new legal rules upon different women's lives.
While these petitions may not show surprising gender-based
differences in termination actions and their success rates, they do
refute many common stereotypes. The simple fact that women
filed more termination petitions than men upsets the common
idea that men are less monogamous or committed to marriage
than women and that men will change partners more fre-
quently.213 Many women obviously had enough support or eco-
nomic resources to at least file a petition when they had reached
the end of their rope.214 Although allegations of adultery do not
207. See infra tbl. 9.
208. See, e.g., STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 322-24 (outlining the proce-
dural requirements of filing a divorce).
209. See infra tbl. 9.
210. See infra tbl. 9.
211. See infra tbl. 9.
212. See infra tbl. 10.
213. See infra tbl. 3.
214. The rope appears to have been of different length for men and women. Although
the data does not distinguish between egregious and trivial, if such exists, cases of adul-
tery and cruelty as between men and women, my own anecdotal notes on the petitions in-
dicate that women cited a greater number of violent and adulterous incidents than men-
incidents which may have persisted over many years-while men primarily alleged one or
two incidents of adultery followed by immediate desertion. Few men alleged multiple acts
of adultery with multiple partners by wives who did not eventually desert them. The
causes and effects of these different patterns of adultery and cruelty deserve further re-
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constitute proof of adultery, wives appeared to be unfaithful at
roughly equal rates to husbands. And despite most respondents
either denying the charge of adultery or alleging condonation or
connivance, most termination suits based on adultery were ulti-
mately successful. 215 Not surprisingly, men were accused of being
cruel or violent significantly more often than women.216 But for
women, allegations of cruelty were necessary for a divorce, and
when made outside the context of adultery were not as successful
as one would imagine (50% success rate).217 Given the common
assumptions of the time-that violence was limited to lower class
families and did not exist in the ranks of the wealthy-one would
have expected claims of violence in these predominantly middle-
and upper-class families to have triggered more concern by law-
yers, critics, and the court.
Much remains to be done with this data. To the extent that
gender-based differences in social norms and legal rules influ-
enced behavior of men and women in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury--differences that are reflected in these petitions-more re-
search needs to be done. My own initial conclusions are that
because men and women began from very different social and le-
gal starting points as they approached marital termination, the
data I have collected must be interpreted through a complex and
nuanced lens. Unfortunately, much of that work must wait until
a later article. At this point, let me fall back on the incredible dis-
crepancy between the cases that appeared before the new court
and the predictions of lawmakers that the court would have very
little business, especially from female petitioners. That the court
broke with expectations is remarkable, and the foregoing data
suggests just how remarkable that break was.
VI. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
Although I began this research with the goal of uncovering the
role of custody in divorce and separation, the frequency of custody
search.
215. See infra tbl. 6.
216. Women accused men of cruelty in 170 out of 291 cases while men accused women
of cruelty in only nine out of 250 cases. See infra tbl. 6. Of course, men did not need to al-
lege cruelty to get a divorce while women did. See generally STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, su-
pra note 2, at 142 (discussing the more extensive options available for husbands). None-
theless, the allegations comport with modern studies of male-induced violence within the
family. See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 23, at 496-500.
217. See infra tbl. 6.
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orders, the likelihood of those orders going in favor of the mother,
and the total number of cases in which the separating parties had
underage children, being able to answer some of the questions
merely raised a host of new ones. The questions I most wanted to
answer were: how many mothers with underage children at home
obtained an order of custody as part of their divorce or separa-
tion?; how many simply retained the children de facto because the
husband had deserted them or did not want custody?; and how
many actually lost custody or access to their children through
their husbands' actions or the court's orders? I also wanted to ex-
plore the extent to which women's decisions about divorces, sepa-
rations, or other remedies for marital breakdown may have been
driven by custody concerns.21 Not surprisingly, I cannot answer
these questions definitively, though the material I collected does
show some important patterns.
In the first nine years, there were sixty-two requests for cus-
tody out of 525 marital termination petitions (fifty-five requests
by wives, seven requests by husbands). 219 These are requests that
appeared at the initial stage of the case, in the first pleading.
Such requests occurred in less than 12% of cases.22 ° Once again,
because the law was not evenly applied and fathers had the right
to custody unless they forfeited it, the burden would be on moth-
ers to defeat the paternal presumption.22' So considering only the
petitions for divorce and judicial separation brought by wives who
had surviving children (161), the fifty-five custody petitions ap-
pear proportionately more numerous (34%).222 Of the eighteen
custody requests that resulted in an order for custody, sixteen
218. To some extent the discussion of custody should precede the discussion on the
sexual double standard, but there are also reasons why the gender material should come
first. Since I cannot present it all simultaneously, I chose the gender material to precede
custody, but I am very aware that custody issues may have driven many of these women's
decisions.
219. See infra tbl. 11. These marital termination actions are divorces, judicial separa-
tions, and annulments.
220. See generally infra tbl. 11.
221. STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS, supra note 110, at 37-38, 425-27; see also Wright,
The Crisis, supra note 3.
222. See infra tbl. 11. Today, the number is 100% of those marriages with minor chil-
dren because the courts require that a formal custody arrangement be made. Within those
divorces involving minor children, mothers request custody in close to 90% of cases, and
they receive custody in roughly 90% of the cases in which they request it. SUSAN
MAIDMENT, CHILD CUSTODY AND DIVORCE: THE LAW IN SOCIAL CONTEXT 61-66 (1984). Al-
though those numbers may have changed somewhat in the last decade, it is important to
note that courts will not order a dissolution of the marriage without insuring that some
provision is made for the minor children. See also Freeman, supra note 5, at 441-70 (dis-
cussing the progress made with regard to children's rights in the twentieth century).
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were granted for the mother, one was granted for the father, and
one father received access.223 Mothers were granted custody at
roughly twice the rate of fathers-sixteen out of fifty-five and one
out of seven requests, respectively.224 However, because the law
granted absolute custody to husbands whose wives committed
adultery,225 we can assume that the fathers also received custody
in the three additional cases in which they were successful in ob-
taining divorces. Only one father was actually denied his custody
petition, while no mothers were. 2 6 However, because fathers were
legally entitled to custody unless an order was made for the
mother, 227 we can assume that in many of the thirty-nine cases in
which the mother petitioned for custody and no order was given,
she did not obtain legal custody of the children.228 Moreover, a
wife's success in the divorce or separation action did not guaran-
tee her an order of custody, though failure to defend a suit
brought by her husband was a guarantee that she would not re-
ceive custody. And for the fathers whose cases were not contin-
ued, three, they would not lose legal custody unless their petition
was denied, which it was in one case.229
See Table 11 in Appendix:
Requests for Custody in Petitions (1858-1866)
Failure to receive a custody order seems not to have been an
indication that the court would deny it were it asked to rule on
the issue. Because requests for custody in the petitions were mere
requests in the initial pleadings-like the request for "such other
and further relief as the court thinks appropriate"-these initial
requests did not fare well unless further steps were taken by the
wife's lawyer to raise the issue before the court. Some women
may not have pursued their initial requests further because they
may have retained physical custody upon informal separation or
223. See infra tbl. 11. Since the father got access in one case, the mother presumably
retained custody, though the court did not make a distinct order for the mother in that
case. The result gave wives legal rights to custody in seventeen cases.
224. See infra tbl. 11.
225. See Arlene Browand Huber, Children at Risk in the Politics of Child Custody
Suits: Acknowledging Their Needs for Nature, 32 J. FAM. L. 33, 38 (1994) (describing one
scheme where a mother convicted of adultery was prevented from taking custody of child).
226. See infra thl. 11.
227. See STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS, supra note 110, at 38.
228. She might have had de facto custody or she might have lost custody to the father
after having had it. There is no way to tell what happened post-termination.
229. See infra tbl. 11. See MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 156 (stating that the father's
rights continue until terminated by court order).
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they may not have faced opposition from their husbands. Pre-
sumably, when the dispute escalated and custody became a con-
tested issue, further steps would be taken by the parties, and the
judge would be forced to make a ruling if he were to rule in the
wife's favor. He could deny an order or simply neglect to make
one, if he were ruling in the husband's favor.
Practice manuals of the period reiterated the rule that fathers
had the prima facie right to custody of their children and there-
fore did not need to request it. One manual went so far as to
point out that "indeed, it is better [for the father not to ask for
custody], because then he is not hampered should he wish to take
the children out of the jurisdiction of the Court."2 30 Once a parent
requested an order of custody, the children became subject to the
jurisdiction of the court and certain actions would require judicial
approval even subsequent to the termination.231
It is difficult to talk about success rate because the playing
field did not begin at a level place. In all seven petitions by fa-
thers for custody, they were also the petitioners for divorce.232
Their request for custody occurred most likely because the mother
had physical custody at the time of the petition. But four of those
seven divorce petitions were granted,233 thus carrying automatic
custody and giving the father the unilateral right to remove the
children from all access to their mother.2 34 One custody petition
by the father was denied in a divorce suit he brought but did not
continue.235 It seems likely that the petition for custody was used
to threaten the wife regarding property or to justify removal of
the children since the divorce petition was later not continued. In
the other two cases in which the father's divorce was not contin-
ued, we do not know if he ever successfully obtained custody
through informal means.
230. WILLIAM LATEY & GEORGE BROWNE, LAW AND PRACTICE IN DIVORCE AND
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES 422 (1873).
231. See MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 167; see also DeManneville v. De Manneville, 10
Ves 51 (1804); Hope v. Hope, 8 DeG. M. & G. 731 (1857) (cases in which the court limited
the power of the parties to remove the children to other jurisdictions).
232. See infra thl. 11.
233. See infra tbl. 14.
234. The bar for adulterous mothers was not lifted until the Guardianship of Infants
Act, 49 & 50 Vict., c. 27, § 5 (1886) (Eng.), though it was not until 1948 that an adulterous
mother was actually considered not "unfit." Custody, however, still likely remained with
the father. See Allen v. Allen, 2 All E.R. 413, 413 (C.A. 1948); MAIDMENT, supra note 222
at 126-31.
235. See infra tbl. 14.
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Of the sixteen custody petitions granted to mothers, ten were
in divorce actions brought by wives that were granted, five were
in judicial separation actions brought by the wife that were
granted, and one was in a judicial separation action that was not
continued. For wives as well as husbands, a custody order was
closely tied to success in the termination action.23' No mother who
asked for custody in an answer to her husband's petition for di-
vorce received custody (zero out of four).237 In one case, a mother
asked for custody in a divorce action that she did not continue,
and the court ordered the child be given to the father's mother.23
Wives asked for custody fifty-five times-fifty-one in cases
brought by themselves-thirty-two of which the divorce or sepa-
ration was granted, and they received an order of custody in only
fifteen of those. 239 Of the thirty-two marital actions that were
granted, an additional six included a claim of desertion, which
may mean that an additional six wives received de facto custody
of their children. Thus, only twenty-one out of fifty-five petitions
by mothers likely resulted in de jure or de facto custody for the
mother.
But why did the eleven women who were successful in their di-
vorce or separation, who asked for custody, and who had not been
deserted, not receive it? Perhaps they had de facto custody and
their husbands did not challenge them. Or, when they asked for
custody, they simply did not follow through on the request be-
cause they did not believe they would get it. Besides the infre-
quency of custody orders, the petitions reveal that very few
women even asked for custody in their petitions (34% of those
bringing suit who had children who had asked for it), and even
fewer actually received a custody order (10% or sixteen out of
161).240 And while the number of custody petitions by mothers in-
creased per year throughout the nine year period, the number of
petitions granted declined relative to the requests.24'
Whether these numbers indicate that significant numbers of
mothers obtained de facto custody through desertion or private
agreement is impossible to say. Certainly there were novels of the
236. See infra tbl. 11.
237. An interim order was made placing the child with the father's mother in Boynton
v. Boynton, 2 Sw. & Tr. 275 (1861), but custody was eventually given to the mother.
238. See infra tbl. 14.
239. See infra tbl. 11.
240. See infra tbl. 11.
241. See infra tbl. 11.
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period depicting deserted families, as well as wives who left abu-
sive husbands and took their children with them.242 A few of the
published cases also involved mothers who took the children
when they left their husbands, though none received a custody
order allowing them to retain the children.243 But the scarceness
of these sources and the outrage that they generated among con-
servative and not-so-conservative social critics suggest that, how-
ever widespread the practice, maternal kidnapping was soundly
discouraged. 2"
The demographics of the petitioners for custody are interesting.
One would have expected that mothers petitioning for custody
would most likely have had children under age seven who re-
quired close supervision, and consequently would not have been
married for very long. A prototypical case was the DeManne-
ville24. case in 1804-the first interspousal custody dispute-in
which the infant child was snatched from its mother's breast by
the father, after a marriage of only a few months.246 The new
mother, wandering forlorn with her newborn child back to her
parents and old friendships would seem most sympathetic to the
new court in 1858, even though it did not work for Mrs. DeMan-
neville in 1804.247 Such a scenario conformed to the cult of true
motherhood that was prevalent during this period, and provided
the mother the best possibility of starting over again after a short
and bitter marriage.2" The other compelling petitioner would be
the long-suffering wife whose wanton and abusive husband had
finally forced her to leave him, taking their large brood of chil-
242. Ann Bronte's Tenant of Wildfell Hall is a good example. See BRONTE, supra note
122; see also OLIPHANT, MARRIAGE OF ELINOR, supra note 122; MARGARET OLIPHANT, SIR
ROBERT'S FORTUNE (Harper & Bros. 1894) (1891) (hereinafter OLIPHANT, SIR ROBERT'S
FORTUNE); TROLLOPE, supra note 122.
243. In fact, a wife's absconding overseas with the children was likely to guarantee that
the husband would receive the custody order. See Greenhill v. Greenhill, 163 Eng. Rep.
162, 162-64 (D. 1836); and Hope v. Hope, 43 Eng. Rep. 534, 540-41 (Ch. 1857).
244. The critics screamed at the unnaturalness of the Bronte novel wife who would vio-
late patriarchal authority so blatantly. See Wright, The Crisis, supra note 3 at 245-46.
245. DeManneville v. DeManneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804).
246. Id. at 763.
247. See id.
248. The cult of true motherhood posited that mothers provided undying and absolute
devotion and love to their children-children whose careful nurturance was their mothers'
highest calling. See id.; see also BRONTE, supra note 122 (depicting a story of a young wife
who remarries after the death of her first husband, but does so much more reluctantly and
wisely). Other novels of the period depicted young, disillusioned wives who had to choose
between their husbands and their children. See, e.g., MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT GODWIN,
MARIA: OR THE WRONGS OF WOMAN (1799), TROLLOPE, supra note 122; OLIPHANT, MAR-
RIAGE OF ELINOR, supra note 122, OLIPHANT, SIR ROBERT'S FORTUNE, supra note 242.
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dren with her as she struck out on her own in late middle-age.249
Despite the visual effect of such dramatic scenes, the numbers be-
lie both myths, for most female petitioners had only one or two
children (thirty-six out of sixty-two petitioners), and the largest
category of petitioners had been married from five to fifteen years
(thirty-eight).25 ° Contrary to our modern assumptions and legal
preference for the tender years doctrine-which states that moth-
ers of infants would be given a preference in custody decisions,
while school-age children would likely to go to their fathers-the
numbers show that most of the children going to mothers were
likely to have been aged seven or older at the time of the di-
vorce.25 1 Only eight of the petitions for custody came from moth-
ers who had been married less than five years, though they had
the highest success rate, receiving nearly a third of all custody
orders.252
See Table 12 in Appendix:
Custody Petitions by Length of Marriage
(1858-1866)
See Table 13 in Appendix
Petitions by Number of Children (1858-1866)
Although Tables 12 and 13 suggest that most wives had one or
two children and were married five to fifteen years, at least a
third of the mothers requesting custody did not fit this profile.
249. Hendrik Hartog's analysis of Abigail Bailey's life fits this model well. Abigail left
her husband of twenty-five years, taking her eleven children with her. See HARTOG, Abi-
gail Bailey's Divorce, supra note 119, at 40-62. Of course, striking out on her own could
just as easily mean summoning the courage and wherewithal to oust an abusive or violent
husband. The key is a wife's mental acceptance that she alone will be responsible for rais-
ing the children. See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 122 (concurring about a young lawyer
whose first case is of a mother who has supported her children on her own while deserted
by the father, but is afraid he will return and claim her property and her children). Ironi-
cally, in the Southworth novel, set in Washington, D.C., our young lawyer is successful at
pleading the tender years doctrine and the equity of abused motherhood-arguments that
notably failed in England. Cf. Wright, The Crisis, supra note 3, at 191.
250. See infra tbl. 12-13. These numbers include the custody petitions by husbands,
which make somewhat more sense, as fathers were likely to get custody of older children.
This was especially true for sons, who could work in the family business or were educated
outside the home.
251. See Amy B. Levin, Comment, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence: How Should
Judges Apply the Best Interests of the Child Standard in Custody and Visitation Cases In-
volving Domestic Violence?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 813, 821-22 (2000).
252. See infra tbl. 12. The tender years doctrine did not become a legally acknowledged
factor until the last two decades of the nineteenth century. See GIBSON & WELDON, supra
note 104, at 168-69; see also Goldstein & Feaster, supra note 16, at 39 (acknowledging a
parliamentary law giving mothers custody of children under seven years of age).
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Fourteen wives had been married longer than fifteen years before
seeking termination, and four received an order of custody even
though courts traditionally allowed children fourteen and over to
choose which parent with whom to live.253 These families are nu-
merous enough to warrant further research.
Looking at custody through the docket sheds an entirely differ-
ent light on the custody situation. The docket database shows
only the custody petitions that resulted in a final order in its first
three and one-third years.254 Notably, proportionally fewer cus-
tody petitions were granted in the first three years than in later
years.255 Of the sixty-three rulings on custody in the docket, Sir
Cresswell granted mothers forty-six custody orders, three access
orders, denied custody in five cases and ordered joint custody in
three cases.25 6 He granted five custody orders for fathers and de-
nied one.257 We cannot compare the success rate of custody re-
quests in the docket with that of the petitions, however, because
the docket identifies only those cases in which an order of custody
was granted or denied by the judge, not cases in which custody
was asked for and the judge did not act on the request and no
mention was made of the request in the docket.
253. MACQUEEN, supra note 10 at 176-177; Marsh v. Marsh, 16 Eng. Rep. 744 (1858);
Hyde v. Hyde, 38 L.J.P.M & A 150 (1859).
254. The procedures on custody were somewhat in flux at this time, and my data is
necessarily imprecise to some extent here. Because a petitioner might request custody in
her divorce petition and the court might never address the issue at all, a note of the re-
quest would come up in the petitions database while there would be no mention of it in the
docket. On the flip side, a petition for custody might have been filed after the initial disso-
lution petition, and it would not show up in the petitions database, however, it would be
indicated in the docket if it were ruled on. Thus, it is difficult to overlay the docket data-
base on the first third of the petitions database. This is partly because the docket database
reflects every case docketed and the petitions only reflect one in five, but also because
some information may be present in one and not in the other. The timing of the requests
will have an impact on which database will reflect it.
255. See infra tbl. 11; infra tbl. 14. Of the 1,045 petitions docketed during that time,
only sixty-three custody requests were ruled on-6.6% of the total divorce and judicial
separation petitions docketed compared to 12% of petitions asking for custody-though it
is impossible to tell from the docket how many requests were made in the initial petition
and how many in later pleadings.
256. See infra tbl. 14. Many contemporary family law scholars believe joint custody is a
fairly new invention, but these cases show it was not. See also HENRY JAMES, WHAT
MAISIE KNEW (1897) (centering around a little girl whose father and mother each had cus-
tody for six months at a time). The brilliance of James's novel is that after the parents
fought bitterly for custody, over time each grew tired of the child, and she was eventually
raised by an old nanny.
257. See infra tbl. 14. Again, this difference makes sense because the docket would only
reflect those custody petitions on which the court ruled, not requests for custody embedded
in other petitions-like the petition for a divorce or judicial separation.
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See Table 14 in Appendix:
Requests for Custody in Docket (1858-1866)
Although the success rate seems high in the docket compared
to the petitions, it is important to understand the limits of the
two databases. The petitions were the initial pleadings in which
many women requested custody, as well as their divorce or ter-
mination. Then the docket, which lists only final orders that
emerged from the court, would indicate those requests that were
successful. All records falling between the filing of the petition
and the final order have been destroyed. It is not surprising,
therefore, that many more requests appear in the petitions than
resulted in final orders-indicating an artificially low success
rate-and that looking only at the docket where final custody or-
ders are shown, portrays an artificially high success rate. If we
try to correlate the numbers of custody requests and their success
rate as derived from the nine years of petitions with the custody
orders and their success rate from the three and one-third years
of the docket, we find that the gap between petitions and final or-
ders grew rather than receded.25 Fewer than half of the mothers
who requested custody in their initial divorce or separation peti-
tions received it, yet many more women received a custody order
from the court than requested it in their petitions.259 Extrapolat-
ing the numbers to correlate with the different sets of data in the
petitions and docket suggests that roughly one-half of all wives
asking for custody did so in their initial petition, and the other
half did so through a supplemental pleading."' But the success
rate suggests that roughly half of the wives who asked for custody
in their petition did not follow up on the request or were ignored
by the court. The other half did have their petitions addressed by
the court, as did those thirty or so wives who added a request for
custody after the petition was filed. The majority of those later
requests were successful.
258. See infra tbl. 14.
259. See infra tbl. 14.
260. See infra tbl. 14. If wives requested custody in fifty-five petitions during the nine
years, we could extrapolate that trend over the 2,540 petitions filed during this period to
deduce that there would be roughly 233 requests for custody. See infra tbl. 14. Forty-five
percent of those were handled in the first three and one-third years, which would lead us
to expect a total of 105 petitions in the docket period requesting custody. Allowing for the
increase in the number of custody petitions over the nine-year period, probably a little less
than eighty would be more realistic. Given a success rate of 29%, we would expect to find
twenty-three to thirty orders for custody in the docket period. In fact, there were fifty-five
requests, a little over half the number expected (fifty-five rather than 105) and forty-five
orders, nearly one and one-half the number expected (forty-five rather than thirty).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
What these numbers tell us about the frequency of custody dis-
putes is important. If we look only at the cases brought by wives,
in which there were likely to be underage children in the home,
less than 35% included a request for custody.26' But of fifty-five
requests for custody in the petitions, only sixteen were granted.
Yet, significantly more custody orders were actually made-forty-
five in the docket period out of an expected twenty-eight- 262 indi-
cating that another 50% of wives requested custody in a supple-
mental pleading that was not preserved in the records. Simply
asking for custody in the petition was unlikely to be enough; fur-
ther follow-up seemed necessary and, if done, was likely to be
successful.
Although these numbers seem small, as many as 30% of wives
with underage children requested custody, the most difficult
question is whether these numbers are, under the circumstances,
unusually high, unusually low, or about what one would expect.
It would probably be unrealistic to expect mothers to petition for
custody of their children in all, or even a majority of cases, when
a mere two years earlier they had virtually no legal rights to their
children whatsoever.263 Moreover, for another fourteen years mar-
ried wives would have no legal rights to their own separate prop-
erty from which they could support their minor children,2" and
their likelihood of receiving alimony or maintenance was quite
low.265 Thus, 30% of mothers requesting custody may be quite
significant.
Perhaps the only thing we can be certain of at this point is that
custody was not considered or granted casually or automatically
by the court. A simple request in the petition was unlikely to be
successful, though with adequate follow-up, a specific request, or
some indication of continuing interest, such a request would be
261. See infra tbl. 14.
262. See infra tbl. 14. The difference is due to the fact that the petitions, answers, and
docket are the only surviving records of these cases. Thus, although many women asked
for custody in their petitions and did not receive it, many more who did receive a custody
order in the docket must have requested it in a supplemental petition, or perhaps even
orally during a hearing. See also MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 167 (discussing the court's
jurisdiction to act on its own discretion with regard to making custody orders, or waiting
until the parties petition for a decision).
263. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
264. MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 176 (discussing the court's power to order child sup-
port). The Married Woman's Property Act would not be passed until 1870, and would be
amended in 1882. See Holcombe, supra note 7; SHANLEY, FEMINISM, supra note 2. See
also infra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
265. See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
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moderately successful. We can, however, speculate about the ex-
ternal factors that might influence a mother's request for custody
at this time. We can assume that custody was likely to be a prior-
ity in cases where the children had property, so as to become a le-
gal agent to manage the property on their behalf.266 For so many
of the families of relatively high income, property belonging to
children might drive the need for a custody order. For the major-
ity of children not in the upper classes, however, lack of property
would not correlate to lack of desire for custody. Lack of property
in wives may have restrained some mothers who knew their in-
come would decrease dramatically upon divorce, such that they
did not seek custody of children they felt they could not support.
Moreover, many wives may not have had the financial means to
pursue a custody order, assuming legal fees would be higher if
additional pleadings were necessary. But of the mothers who did
pursue both custody and alimony, the alimony received placed
them in the lower half of the socioeconomic class of all women
who received alimony, so there is some indication that it was the
poorer women who sought custody.267
On the other hand, in many of the divorce and separation peti-
tions brought by wives, desertion was one of the grounds offered
by the petitioner.26 Of the 297 marital termination petitions
brought by wives in the nine-year period, ninety-four included a
claim of desertion.269 Nearly 32% of wives, therefore, claimed de-
sertion by their husbands, and sixteen of the fifty-five requests
for custody were by wives who had claimed desertion.2" Though it
is certainly not true that every husband who deserted his wife
266. At this time, custody rights often brought with them rights over property owned
by the child. This is a vestige of the old socage guardianship which usually allowed the
child and his property to become the wards of the closest relative who could not inherit
from him. See John Seymour, Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their Nature and
Origins, 14 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 160-88 (1994); Wright, DeManneville, supra note
30, at 265-72.
267. Of the sixty-three cases docketed in which custody orders of some sort were made
by Sir Cresswell, alimony was awarded in only twenty-two, with an average award of £77.
This average was less than the overall average of alimony awards, so we cannot say that
wives in the upper classes were more likely to request custody than wives in the lower
classes. In fact, of those wives receiving alimony, those receiving custody as well were
more often in the lower half than in the upper half. For further discussion of alimony, see
infra Part VII.C.
268. Desertion combined with adultery or bigamy was grounds for divorce, and deser-
tion alone was grounds for a judicial separation. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Di-
vorce and Matrimonial Cases in England, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, §§ XVI, XXVII (1857) (Eng.).
269. See infra tbl. 14. There were 551 petitions filed, 297 by wives and 254 by hus-
bands, of which ninety-four by wives and twenty-six by husbands included desertion.
270. See infra tbls. 6, 11, 14.
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also left the children with her, it can be assumed that where de-
sertion truly occurred, custody was not likely to be a contested is-
sue, and the parties believed a legal order would not be neces-
sary.2 7 1
Finally, twenty-two out of the 153 cases in which alimony was
requested also included a request for custody.272 This is roughly
the same percentage overall for custody requests in the court
docket, indicating that there was no higher correlation between
alimony and custody petitions, or that women who asked for one
were more likely to ask for the other. Thus, custody was not re-
quested in greater percentages when alimony was requested or
was not used to increase alimony. Yet, 60% of likely cases by
wives, in which the husband had not deserted and there were
children present, did not include a request for custody. This
makes the petitions for custody that were filed appear to be rela-
tively unusual in number, though quite usual in demographics.
That is, they do not appear with greater frequency in certain
types of cases and I can only conclude that custody simply was
not an issue that most people looked to the court to resolve. This
is not to say that many mothers and fathers did not fight over
custody of their children. In fact, many did. 273 But the lack of cor-
relation of custody petitions to property, tender age of the chil-
dren, length of marriage and even desertion show that custody
was an important yet not all-consuming issue before the court in
its early years.
Moreover, in the court docket, there were fewer than ten cases
in which the court entered a separate custody order after a sepa-
rate hearing.274 To the court, therefore, custody orders were most
often integrated into the marital termination action, and were not
separately contested issues.
271. There is some overlap of the numbers here. This statistic comes to life when we
consider the case of Abigail Bailey. See HARTOG, Abigail Bailey's Divorce, supra note 119.
Abigail Bailey's husband, Asa, had sexually assaulted their daughter, and when she fi-
nally developed the strength to oust him from the home, he took the three eldest sons of
their eleven children. Id at 46-62.
272. These numbers are just for the full court docket, not the summary docket.
273. See e.g., Duggan v. Duggan, 38 L.J.P.M.&A. 159 (1860); Suggate v. Suggate, 164
Eng. Rep. 830, 831 (1859); Hyde v. Hyde, 38 L.J.P.M.&A. 150 (1859); Marsh v. Marsh, 164
Eng. Rep. 744, 744 (1858); Spratt v. Spratt, 164 Eng. Rep. 699, 699 (1858); Curtis v. Cur-
tis, 164 Eng. Rep. 688, 688 (1858); see also NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE, supra
note 7; NUGENT, WESTMEATH, supra note 7.
274. Derived from source records.
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It is notable that the custody petitions increased over the
years, from an average of 5.6 per year in the first three years, to
275an average of nine per year in the last three years. While cus
tody requests nearly doubled, the total number of petitions filed
decreased over the period, indicating that proportionately more
wives were adding a claim for custody to their termination peti-
tions. When we look at the case law coming out of the court dur-
ing its first decade, we can see why. The court readily adopted a
rule tying custody to marital fault; thus, the spouse at fault for
the break-up would most likely lose custody.276 In the late 1860s,
the appellate court reversed this rule, going back to the stricter
paternal forfeiture rule which gave fathers a near absolute right
to custody unless they forfeited it through physical endanger-
ment."' But for the period covered by the petitions, it would ap-
pear that word was slowly getting around that innocent wives
might receive an order of custody if they asked for it.
The infrequency of the custody petitions can be explained both
in terms of a disincentive caused by a negative legal climate-
mothers had been consistently losing custody petitions for dec-
ades-and their lack of correlation to other issues, like property,
desertion, or number of children. There were clearly about 30% of
mothers who felt that a custody petition was necessary, but 70%
did not.27 Those latter families are still a mystery as to whether
they came up with amicable custody arrangements, one party
simply did not want to contest the other's de facto custody, or the
children were old enough to express their own wishes, which were
respected. But of the cases in which custody was requested-the
overwhelming number were by wives 279 -they did not correlate to
alimony requests, and of petitions filed with alimony requests,
the income level of the majority of parties who fought over their
children would appear to be solidly middle class.2"' These wives
were older and had been married for over ten years and they
275. See infra tbl. 11.
276. Martin v. Martin, 29 L.J.P.M.&A. 106 (1860); Wright, The Crisis, supra note 3, at
250.
277. See, e.g., Curtis, 164 Eng. Rep. at 688.
278. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
279. See infra tbl. 11.
280. Compare tbl. 14, with tbl. 23. One custody petition was by a person who received
alimony of only £5, one at £16, six were between £30 and £50, six were between £50 and
£100, and one was at £400. Thus, the majority were between £30 and £100.
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fought most over one or two children-a demographic that also
correlates with an urban, middle-class population.2"'
VII. PROPERTY
There were three principal ways in which the new court's pow-
ers over property could affect married and divorced wives. First
were protective orders for property that would prevent husbands
from claiming their wives' wages, earnings, and savings by giving
a wife feme sole status if he had deserted her.2"2 Second were
property settlements that were ordered as part of the divorce or
judicial separation.2 3 Some of these occurred as a way to dispose
of damages awards from co-respondents in divorce suits by hus-
bands against adulterous wives. Others occurred as simple prop-
erty settlements in suits by wives against husbands. Third were
alimony orders.28 4 Some historians have claimed that wives filed
divorce and separation petitions primarily in order to get an
award of alimony.28 5 But the infrequency of alimony awards calls
into question this suggestion. Moreover, the large minority of
alimony petitions by wives who were respondents reveals that
alimony petitions were very often used by husbands to complicate
suits by husbands for divorce, rather than to permanently settle
the property relationships of the couple post-separation. Yet the
different types of property orders do tell us certain things about
the economic resources of the petitioners, their property needs,
and their strategic uses of property-based petitions and plead-
ings.
The most common complaints about women's inability to con-
trol property centered around their incapacities during marriage,
their inability to keep separate inheritances out of their hus-
bands' hands, and their lack of control over their own wages and
debts.28 6 The new court did nothing to rectify this imbalance.
281. See Gail Savage, The Operation of the 1857 Divorce Act, 1860-1910, 16 J. SOC.
HIsT. 103, 106-07 (1983) (comparing the class of the petitioners with the relevant census
dates).
282. See An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in
England, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XXI (1857) (Eng.).
283. See id. §§ XXV, XXVI, XXXIII.
284. See id. § XXXII.
285. See id.; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2 at 183.
286. See Holcombe, supra note 7, at 48-87; NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE,
supra note 7, at 152-61; SHANLEY, FEMINISM, supra note 2, at 29-35. Shanley, "One Must
Ride Behind," supra note 2, at 356; see generally AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND
PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1995).
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However, it did have the power to order protective orders for
those wives who had been deserted. Such an order would prevent
an errant husband from returning and invading his wife's sav-
ings, personal property, or claiming her wages. These property
orders were routinely granted and comprised a significant
percentage of the court's docket in the first few years. To the
extent that critics objected to husbands who returned and raided
their wives' savings, the main focus of their criticism was on
protecting wives who worked, not wives who were wealthy
enough to have family support or savings that allowed them to
remain in the domestic sphere.287 Although the court did not
grant a judicial separation or divorce in these cases, and therefore
their order potentially affected the property rights of women
during coverture, the order was granted only if the wife had
proved desertion for at least two years. 8 Since desertion was
sufficient grounds for a judicial separation, we must wonder why
a wife would seek only the protective order and not a judicial
separation as well, especially since a judicial separation would
return a wife to feme sole status for property purposes.
Conversely, if a judicial separation had no other legal effect than
to return a wife to feme sole status with regard to her property,
we must ask why any wife would pursue the time-consuming and
expensive separation over the simpler property order. 289
A. Protective Property Orders
Women who had been deserted by their husbands-who feared
that they might return and take possession of whatever property
they had accumulated-could petition the court for a protective
order declaring that any property they acquired after a certain
date would be held in their own name as if they were femes
sole.29° Protective orders for property provided a way for married
287. See Holcombe, supra note 7, at 237-38 (focusing more on protecting the earnings
of working-class women than the inheritances of upper-class women because the latter
had equitable remedies in the Chancery); SHANLEY, FEMINISM, supra note 2, at 49-78.
288. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XXI (Eng.). More than 75%, however, proved desertion for
three years or more. See infra tbl. 18.
289. I suggest later that this is possibly because judicial separations were more diffi-
cult to obtain and more time-consuming. That suggestion is not entirely satisfactory,
however, when the number of property orders declined, indicating either that the order did
not adequately serve womens' needs, or they found alternative mechanisms to resolve
their property issues.
290. This is analogous to the clock stopping on modern notions of marital or community
property after separation.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
women to protect their wages, their debts, their contracts, and
their personal property. Protective orders seem to have been used
primarily by women who worked, had small businesses, or who
were active participants in the market economy.29' For those re-
formers who complained about married women's inability to con-
trol the property they brought to the marriage, even their clothes
and personal accessories, the reform gave no relief. The protective
order would be back-dated only to the date when the husband had
been gone for two years. All property acquired before that time
was unaffected, including property brought to the marriage or ac-
quired by a wife's labor before the desertion.292
Despite the property order's limitations, a significant number
of the court's petitions in the first years were for property orders,
and a disproportionate number of the property petitions were
filed in the first year.293 In 1858, property orders represented 16%
of the total number of petitions filed, while in 1865, property or-
ders represented only 6% of the total number of petitions filed.2 94
Although the property petitions give relatively little demographic
information about the petitioner, the average length of marriage
for women who filed for these protective orders was 16.6 years-
slightly longer than the majority of women filing for marital ter-
mination.295 Of all fifty property petitions examined for the nine-
year period, 72% were granted, 24% were not continued, and 4%
were rejected.296 The majority of these petitions were summarily
granted, as the only proof necessary was proof of desertion.2 97
When these petitions were rejected, the grounds tended to be
failure to prove desertion because the husband had entered an
appearance and answered the petition with a denial.298
291. For a thorough study of working-class Victorian women, see KARL ITTMAN, WORK,
GENDER AND FAMILY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1995).
292. Such property, under coverture, belonged entirely to husbands. Also, property re-
lations of upper and middle class families that were the result of extensive estate planning
were most likely unaffected.
293. 16% of the petitions filed in the first year were for property orders, and 32% of the
total property orders in the docket occurred in the first year. See infra tbl. 1, 2; infra tbl.
15.
294. See infra tbl. 15.
295. See infra tbl. 15.
296. See infra tbl. 15.
297. This is a remarkably high success rate which can be explained by the relatively
pro forma nature of the action.
298. It also appeared that some women, who wanted a divorce and could not get it be-
cause they had difficulty serving notice on their husbands, would instead resort to a prop-
erty order and an allegation of desertion to prevent their husbands returning from abroad
and reclaiming their conjugal rights. To some extent some working-class women may have
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See Table 15 in Appendix:
Success Rate for Petitioners Who Filed for
Protective Orders
In looking only at the court docket, we see the number of total
property orders requested during that time and their success
rate. I reviewed sixty-six in full and thirty-three in summary
form totaling ninety-nine. 299 Almost twice as many were filed in
1858 as in 1859 (forty-nine in 1858 and twenty-five in 1859) and
then the numbers fell even more thereafter, with only seventeen
in 1860 and eight in the first third of 1861.300 During this period,
the court granted eighty-one of the petitions, rejected thirteen,
and five were not continued. 0 1 This was the highest success rate
for any cause of action before the court. °2 Moreover, of the sixty-
six petitions reviewed in full, the length of time between filing the
petition and the court granting an order was less than one week
in nearly half the cases, and less than two weeks in 65% of the
cases. 30 3 No petition took longer than seven weeks for a final or-
der.30
4
See Table 16 in Appendix:
Length of Time to Grant or Deny Protective Order
(1858-1861)
The high success rate and summary process suggest that the
court was favorably disposed to protect the property of wives who
had been deserted. And lawmakers seemed virtually unconcerned
with effects of property orders on family stability. While building
roadblocks to de jure divorce, the statute showed very little con-
cern for the de facto separations that would be legitimized with
the property order.305 At the same time, the property order may
used the property order to enable them to operate as femes sole in the marketplace and
thus appear unmarried, opening up the possibility of a second, bigamous marriage. But see
GEORGE K. BEHLMER, FRIENDS OF THE FAMILY: THE ENGLISH HOME AND ITS GUARDIANS,
1850-1940, at 199-200 (1998) (discussing the working-class women who misunderstood
the function of the protective order and saw it as a weapon to prevent physical abuse).
299. See infra tbl. 15.
300. See infra tbl. 15.
301. See infra tbl. 15.
302. Wives who petitioned for and received a divorce had the next highest success rate
at 70%. See infra tbl. 5.
303. See infra tbl. 16.
304. This is in contrast to the petitions for divorce and judicial separation which gener-
ally took a minimum of a year to resolve, even when entirely unopposed.
305. See An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Cases in Eng-
land, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 85, § XXI (1857) (Eng.).
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have been viewed as the only way to stabilize property relations
during a period of high desertion and emigration in an increas-
ingly mobile population.
Comparing the docket to the petitions shows that the success
rate of 81% in the first three and one-third years dropped to only
72% over the nine-year period, °6 while the number of petitions
that were rejected or dismissed also fell, from 13% in the earlier
period to only 4% over the longer period.3°7 At the same time, the
average length of marriage declined from twenty-four and a half
years in the first year to fourteen years in the last year.30 ' Not
surprisingly, the high success rate and long marriage age indi-
cates that the earliest petitioners for a protective property order
were middle-aged to elderly women who had been deserted for
many years and had meanwhile established stable businesses or
had amassed significant savings to afford the legal expense. By
the end of the period, from 1862 until 1866, the typical petitioner
more closely resembled the class of wives petitioning for termina-
tion; they were ten years younger and did not continue their cases
roughly 30% of the time.3 9 This dramatic change suggests that
the women in these later petitions may have had less property, a
more difficult time showing desertion, or perhaps were less suc-
cessful because they were using the property order for more stra-
tegic reasons than their predecessors.310
Although the total number of petitions declined, the number of
petitions that were not continued increased sharply over the nine-
year period, and this is troubling. 1' The 5% rate for not continu-
ing their cases in the earlier period more than quadrupled over
the nine-year period to 24%.312 As discussed earlier, an increase
306. See infra tbl. 15.
307. See infra tbl. 15.
308. See infra tbl. 15.
309. See infra tbl. 15.
310. George Howard credits the decline in property orders to the 1870 and 1882 Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts, but he fails to note the tremendous decline that occurred be-
fore 1870. See 2 HOWARD, supra note 13, at 116-17. He does note, however, that the prop-
erty order was of little use to poor women because it did not relieve them from
cohabitation, permit them to pledge their husbands' credit for necessaries, or compel their
husbands to pay alimony. See id. Real relief in cases of desertion did not come for these
wives until 1886, when maintenance orders could be made by justices of the peace or sti-
pendiary magistrates. See An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Maintenance of Mar-
ried Women Who Shall Have Been Deserted by Their Husbands, 49 & 50 Vict., c 52 (1886)
(Eng.).
311. See infra tbl. 15.
312. See infra tbl. 15. Because of overlap in the two databases, the decline in total
numbers of petitions filed, as well as the corresponding decline in the success rate would
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in the number of petitions not continued is problematic as it ei-
ther indicates the petitioner lacked the economic means to con-
tinue, stopped the suit because she felt she would lose, or reached
an informal resolution.313 The first and second indications are the
most problematic, yet also the most likely because there would be
no informal resolution that could otherwise protect the wife's
property.
The decline in property orders generally may indicate that
many women, who would have settled for a property order in the
first couple of years, determined that a separation or divorce
would be more beneficial in the later years and therefore chose
that route. But the decline may also indicate an overall dissatis-
faction with the remedy, especially since it would not protect any
property acquired prior to the date of desertion. The dramatic rise
in property petitions that were not continued corresponded to an
overall increase in abandoned petitions throughout all causes of
action and may be less cause of concern than those petitions that
might invoke violent retribution on petitioning wives.4 But they
do show that even for women who had been deserted by their
husbands, the legal rewards of going to court were not automatic.
If these women discontinued their suits because they lacked eco-
nomic resources or could not prove desertion, they would be left in
a very vulnerable position indeed.
One explanation for the decline in the total number of property
petitions filed is that, in the first three years of the court's exis-
tence, many women who were seeking protective orders had been
deserted many years earlier, and when the opportunity finally
became available, they rushed to take advantage of it. As the
court took care of the backlog, women filed for orders less often,
and only as they became necessary. This is borne out by the de-
cline in the average length of the marriage for each of the peti-
tions filed during the nine-year period.31 5 The average length was
significantly longer in the first three years than in the latter six
seem to be even more pronounced. Moreover, death would be less likely to influence these
cases as many women had no idea of the whereabouts of their husbands and whether they
were even still alive.
313. For a discussion of noncontinuance and its probable indications, see supra notes
114-19 and accompanying text.
314. See infra tbls. 5, 15. Of course, the failure to prove desertion may mean that their
husbands were hanging around and thus could return to vent their frustrations in violent
ways-or, as women obviously feared, lay claim to their property or earnings. MACQUEEN,
supra note 10, at 380-81 (discussing the reappearance of deserting husbands who then lay
claim to the earnings and savings of their wives).
315. See infra tbl. 17.
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years, and the average length of marriage stayed between twelve
and fifteen years for the latter six years.316 This decline and then
leveling off suggests that in the first three years, protective order
petitions were filed by many women who probably would have
filed earlier-as much as ten years earlier-had the remedy been
available. But once the majority of those backlogged situations
were remedied, the court's docket leveled out to relatively few
cases each year, which were handled when the need arose.
See Table 17 in Appendix:
Property Petitions by Length of Marriage
This conclusion is also supported by parliamentary returns
comparing the date of desertion with the date of filing for a pro-
tective order." 7 As seen below, 37% of petitioners in the first
three and one-half years had been deserted for longer than ten
years, and an additional 27% had been deserted between five and
ten years.31 8 Less than one-quarter (23%) had been recently de-
serted.319
See Table 18 in Appendix:
Length of Time Between Petition for Property
Protection and Desertion (January 1858 to July 1861)
Although the average length of marriage for women filing for
protective orders roughly corresponded to the wives who filed the
most marital termination actions, the majority were either rela-
tively young wives (five to ten years). These groups did not have
the highest success rate in their divorce and judicial separation
actions and may have found a property order to be easier to ob-
tain.32' This can be read in two ways. We can view the property
petitions as informal, inexpensive judicial separations and thus
consider these with the petitions seeking marital termination.
Doing so would show that wives filed significantly over half of all
actions in the court, and did so because their marriages had been
dysfunctional for at least five years. Or, we can keep the property
petitions separate from the termination actions and view them,
perhaps, as a third option for working-class wives to protect
316. See infra tbl. 17.
317. See Returns Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes (July 30, 1861), in 3
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 193-94 of BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1971) [hereinafter
Returns].
318. See infra tbl. 18.
319. See infra t01. 18.
320. See infra tbls. 9, 17.
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themselves and their children primarily from the property as-
pects of coverture. Keeping them separate helps distinguish be-
tween termination actions and property actions in order to more
finely analyze the different effects the court's actions had on
marital termination. I think we need to do both, understanding
that the court's actions had different effects on marital status and
property, and yet, that status and property were interconnected
for many of these female petitioners.
The protective orders also are important for showing that over
15% of all cases brought by women before the court in the first
three and one-third years were petitions by women who had
amassed enough property to need protection, and who were ap-
parently active in the economic market.321 A protective order
would protect a married woman's wages and her accumulated
wealth from errant husbands. Without wealth or wages, she
would not need such an order. But while 15% seems small, it is in
fact quite large when we consider that these women were entitled
to at least a judicial separation that would have accomplished the
same goal and given them public recognition of their status as
single women. So why would 15% of wives who could get a judi-
cial separation seek only a protective order? One logical explana-
tion is that the lower cost and the shorter time-delay were more
attractive for a protective order than a judicial separation.322 A
deserted wife could get a cheap and "quickie divorce" by obtaining
a protective order that would allow her to appear in the economic
world as a feme sole, and the lower cost would make this remedy
available to working-class women.323
321. See infra tbls. 1, 15, 17. From the petitions, I noticed that many of the women had
small businesses, working as dressmakers, milliners, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and board-
inghouse keepers.
322. Despite the fact that Parliament wanted to create a court that would make divorce
and separation available to all classes of litigants, the costs of litigation still precluded
many women from formally dissolving their marriages. The cost of even a simple uncon-
tested divorce or separation generally ran between £80 and £100. See infra Part VIII.C.
323. It seems quite likely, therefore, that some of these petitioners for protective orders
might use them as informal divorces. Because they could operate in the economic market-
place like femes sole, deserted wives could appear unmarried and perhaps contract a sec-
ond marriage without legally dissolving the first. This is not entirely farfetched as there
were a small handful of divorce petitions by husbands alleging bigamy by wives. To the
extent that marriage still required some element of community repute, bigamy among the
lower classes may in fact have been a significant problem. See E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS
IN COMMON 404-62 (1991), for more information about informal marriage and divorce
practices among the working classes. See also STEPHEN PARKER, INFORMAL MARRIAGE,
COHABITATION AND THE LAW, 1750-1989 (1990).
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But, if the protective order was attractive enough to convince
one in seven women entitled to a separation to seek only a protec-
tive order, why did they taper off so dramatically over the nine-
year period?324 To the extent these wives were using property or-
ders strategically for other ends, the decline does not make sense.
Without evidence that the judicial separation got easier or
cheaper, it makes no sense that protective orders would taper off.
Absent any other evidence that women were using the property
order as a de facto divorce, the numbers seem to indicate that
women sought and obtained exactly the remedy they desired.
The flip side of the question, however, must also be asked:
namely, why did so many women seek a judicial separation which
would not give them any significant additional rights beyond a
protective order, except a public recognition of the separation?
The only meaningful legal result was a return to feme sole status,
which could be achieved by a cheaper, simpler property order. In
other words, if there was no legal difference between a property
order and a judicial separation,32 why take the time, trouble, and
money to get a judicial separation? And yet, 214 wives sought a
separation during the same period that ninety-nine wives sought
property orders.326 Of course, property orders were not available
to wives whose husbands had only committed adultery or were
guilty of cruelty, but had not actually deserted them. But given
the high rates of undefended (i.e., default) actions, it would seem
that a majority of the divorce and separation actions were collu-
sive, and could just as easily have been based on desertion.327
Moreover, if the legal effect of the two actions was virtually the
same, the women who had to seek the more time-consuming and
expensive separation were at a disadvantage compared to those
wives whose husbands deserted them. Ironically, the incentives to
desert would seem quite high and it is surprising that desertion
was not the most popular ground for all termination actions, es-
pecially since desertion was an easy way to achieve a mutually
324. Women filed for sixteen property orders in 1858, out of a total of fifty-six petitions
for divorce, judicial separation, and property orders, (29%) and only three property orders
in 1865, out of a total of thirty-five (9%). See infra tbls. 4, 15.
325. There would be a defense against a restitution of conjugal rights suit brought by a
husband when a wife had obtained a judicial separation, though these actions were so rare
as to seem irrelevant to a wife's decision as to which action to pursue.
326. See infra tbls. 3, 11, 15.
327. Between January 11, 1858 and July 30, 1861, 445 divorce actions were brought,
416 were granted, and twenty-nine were refused. Of those 445 divorce actions, 315, or
nearly 71% were undefended at trial. See Returns, supra note 317, at 183.
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agreed-upon collusive divorce. The fact that it was not is signifi-
cant, given the legal incentives to desert an incompatible spouse.
Perhaps even more interesting is that at least one in seven fe-
male petitioners were either running businesses, working for
wages, or had property that they wished to protect from returning
husbands.328 In addition, all women who successfully obtained a
divorce or a judicial separation would also have their property
protected as they would be, de jure, returned to feme sole
status.3 29 By custom in London, married women who owned busi-
nesses could already enter into contracts as femes sole, and could
own some limited property." Thus, only women residing outside
London may have needed the protection of a property order. And
by 1870, the need for protective orders would decrease as married
women would gain limited rights to own their own property.331
The petitions reflect, therefore, that a significant number of wives
were functioning in the economic sphere and viewed freedom to
operate within that sphere as far more important than terminat-
ing their bad marriages.
The practical uses of protective orders and their place in the
history of the breakdown of coverture have yet to be thoroughly
analyzed, but the preliminary findings show that a significant
number of married women were operating in the economic mar-
ketplace, contrary to the cult of domesticity that relegated mid-
dle-class women to the non-economic domestic sphere. They were
willing to use protective orders to limit the power of their hus-
bands to assert their traditional rights over the marital prop-
erty.33 2 The court appears to have treated these orders as com-
328. See infra tbls. 5, 15. This number is likely to be higher because many of the
women who obtained a divorce or judicial separation would also have been economic actors
and received the benefit of property protections.
329. It was only in those cases where the divorce or judicial separation was not contin-
ued or dismissed, or the protective order was denied, that married women would still be
vulnerable to their husbands claiming their property. The Married Women's Property Act
was not passed in England until 1870, so the only way married women could protect their
wages or assets was through a protective order, judicial separation, or divorce. An Act to
Amend the Law Relating to Property of Married Women, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93 (1870)
(Eng.).
330. See BAKER, supra note 66, at 484; Beard v. Webb, 126 Eng. Rep. 1175 (C.P. 1800).
331. The first statute granting women property rights was passed in 1870, and was
later strengthened in 1882. See 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.); An Act to Consolidate and
Amend the Acts Relating to the Property of Married Women, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75 (1882)
(Eng.).
332. Caroline Norton experienced what may have been a typical crisis when her es-
tranged husband, George, after numerous battles over custody and separation, and after
they had been separated for years, demanded all savings and royalties from her books and
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monplace and readily granted them with few inquiries. The sheer
number of petitions in the first couple of years of the court's exis-
tence showed that many women rushed to do what they could to
protect their property from deserting husbands. But why the
numbers decreased so much as the period progressed is some-
thing of a mystery. It could be that many women did not feel a
protective order was necessary, either because those who were at
risk simply obtained a divorce or separation instead, or because
fewer women were operating in the economic sphere and needed
such protection. Perhaps they found that the protective order did
not help very much, and they needed a separation or divorce
anyway.333 Thus, while protective orders were a significant func-
tion of the court in its first few years, the decrease in property pe-
titions and the growing willingness of the court to interfere with
property settlements between husbands and wives during disso-
lution indicate that the court's power over property may have
been shifting to other avenues, like property settlements and ali-
mony.
poems simply by appearing at her banker's window. See NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S
DEFENSE, supra note 7, at X-XI. She denounced this power in her next pamphlet and sub-
sequently decided to stop paying her creditors. See id. at XI. She felt that if he could claim
all her property then he should be forced to pay her debts, which was a husband's duty
under coverture. When George refused, Caroline encouraged a creditor to sue George for
payment of his wife's debts which enabled Caroline to appear and testify against her hus-
band. See id. The entire sordid case exposed the problems with the property aspects of
coverture when the parties did not obtain a legal divorce. George and Caroline had at-
tempted to agree on a private separation agreement, but negotiations had broken down
because George would not permit Caroline to have access to their children. See id. Thus,
for most of her adult life, Caroline was a separated, married woman who had no property
of her own, no right to her children, and no way to obtain a divorce or judicial separation
to return her to feme sole status. Caroline's main problem with seeking a legal remedy to
her marital woes was condonation. See id. A spouse who allowed an adulterous spouse
back in his or her bed, or who allowed an abusive spouse back home was not entitled to a
divorce because he or she supposedly condoned the adultery or cruelty and could not later
seek a remedy because of it. See id. Caroline had allowed George back home after his last
violent attack on her, even though they slept in separate rooms, and was thus not allowed
to seek a divorce or separation. While the Married Women's Property Act did not explicitly
abolish the doctrine of condonation, after 1858 the new court did not withhold remedies on
this ground. For a full description, see id. at 79-93; and Holcombe, supra note 7, at 55.
333. See BEHLMER, supra note 298, at 199-200, for a discussion of the misperceptions
of working-class wives who thought a protective order would protect them from violent
husbands. They believed they could get "protection" in the magistrates' courts as late as
the 1950s. Although the Divorce Act gave the police courts the power to grant protective
orders, these were for property, just like the power of the divorce court. An Act to Amend
the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, §
XXI (1857) (Eng.).
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B. Property Settlements
There were two situations in which property settlements for
wives would be ordered by the new court. The first were cases in
which the husband filed for divorce and received an award of
damages from the co-respondent. The court could settle the award
on the wife or the children, presumably seen by Parliament as a
way to make the damages action more palatable.334 The second
were cases in which the court would order some settlement of
property on the wife to adjust for the husband's marital breach or
to account for property the wife brought to the marriage.35 In nei-
ther situation were there many settlements, though the scarcity
of cases suggests that one-time property settlements were not a
priority for either litigants or the court. The numbers increased
over time, however, while property protection petitions fell, sug-
gesting perhaps that settlements began to replace property or-
ders, even though they served very different classes of women.336
For those cases in which a husband sued his wife for a divorce
on the grounds of her adultery and named the co-respondent,
there was always a possibility that he would be awarded damages
from the co-respondent for alienation of his wife's affections. This
was essentially a continuation of the criminal conversation cause
of action that had been a necessary precursor to a parliamentary
divorce before 1858."' 7 In the three and one-third years covered by
the docket, husbands filed 441 divorce actions against their wives
and a co-respondent, and in only twenty-four cases did the hus-
band receive an order of damages from the co-respondent-an or-
der that required a jury trial.33 Thus, a little more than 5% of di-
vorces by husbands resulted in a damages award, and in seven of
those (or nearly one-third), the award was nominal (one far-
thing).3 9 Eleven of those awards were over £100, and five of those
334. The Royal Commission on Divorce acknowledged that Parliament was concerned
for wives in early divorce actions by establishing the "Ladies Friend" to insure that wives
had some property settlements. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 11;
Wolfram, supra note 2, at 161 n.22. Lawmakers seemed more concerned about men being
able to use the damages awards to pay for the court costs in the divorce than in supporting
errant wives. 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 918-19, 1412.
335. Readjustment of property settled upon marriage was not allowed until 1859 and
the first set of amendments. See An Act to Make Further Provision Concerning the Court
for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 61, § V (1859) (Eng.).
336. See infra tbls. 15, 17.
337. Although Parliament abolished the criminal conversation action, it allowed dam-
ages under the same legal theory. See 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XXXIII (Eng.).
338. See infra tbl. 4; infra tbl. 19.
339. See infra tbl. 19.
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(or nearly half) were settled in a separate fund for the wife's
use.3"' The largest award, £10,000 against the Marquis of Angle-
sey, appeared to have been agreed upon in advance as a way to
compensate the husband for loss of property he was entitled to in
the marriage settlement.34'
Settling damages awards on wives was an innovation allowed
under the new act, though it may have continued a practice in
Parliament.342 In the past, fallen wives were left to starve or be
cared for by relatives or their seducers.343 If the courts thought
that fallen women would be forever supported by their seducers,
they were out of touch with the likely fate of these women.
More likely, they would fall on the charity of their families or the
parish when their seducers tired of them. Parliament also spent a
significant amount of time debating the wisdom of a policy pro-
hibiting a husband or wife from marrying the lover with whom he
or she was guilty of adultery, which was the law in Scotland.345 In
some sense, the damages provision was in lieu of a remarriage
prohibition. Lawmakers wanted to discourage seduction, but were
not willing to go so far as to prohibit remarriage by the guilty
parties, especially if remarriage would force the seducer to sup-
port the woman whose reputation he had destroyed. While the
damages provision does not necessarily serve the same ends as a
prohibition on remarriage, the provision indirectly serves the
same end as the refusal to prohibit the remarriage; namely, both
reflect a concern with protecting fallen women. Hence, the ability
to settle the damages awards on these women was a way to still
punish seducers and yet protect fallen wives, while the remar-
riage prohibition only accomplished the former.
340. See infra tbl. 19.
341. See HORSTMAN, supra note 2, at 144.
342. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 11-12; Wolfram, supra note
2, at 161.
343. A particularly heinous situation arose in Mrs. Henry Wood's famous novel of the
period, East Lynne, in which the heroine, seduced to leave her husband and children, is
finally divorced and begs her seducer to marry her. His callous response, however, would
send a chill down the spine of any Victorian wife who had fantasized running off with her
lover. He responded that now that he had come into his estates he certainly could not de-
mean himself by marrying a divorced woman. See MRS. HENRY WOOD, EAST LYNNE (Rut-
gers Univ. Press. 1984) (1861).
344. Count Vronsky, in Leo Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, appears to have been rarer than
most seducers in that he wanted to marry the women he had ruined. See LEO TOLSTOY,
ANNA KARENINA (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky, trans. 2001). Sir John Trelawny
was more worried that women would commit adultery to benefit their children. 147 PARL.
DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1870.
345. See 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1982; 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 491-515.
Also, this prohibition existed in some of the American states until into the 1960s.
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See Table 19 in Appendix:
Damage Awards (1858-1861)
Criminal conversation actions in the century before the new
court, however, reflect markedly different outcomes than those
overseen by Sir Cresswell. Between 1770 and 1850, more than
half of the 143 damages actions that preceded parliamentary di-
vorces resulted in an award of £1000 or more.3 46 Of 143 cases,
only five gave nominal damages of less than £5, and seven gave
very high awards between £10,000 and £20,000.3 7
The small number of cases after 1858 that resulted in such an
award is not surprising. Commentators had criticized the crimi-
nal conversation action for years as an embarrassment to na-
tional honor.3 48 Some saw it as a method for collusive couples to
prostitute the wife, blackmail the unsuspecting lover, and set
themselves up with a tidy nest egg. Others saw it as a way for
dishonorable men to buy off the victims of their debauchery, espe-
cially aristocratic scoundrels who preyed on wholesome middle
and working-class families.3 49 Although it was a necessary pre-
cursor to a parliamentary divorce in the years immediately pre-
ceding the reform, its rapid disappearance suggests that even
husbands had little desire to retain the action.
Besides being socially unpalatable, the criminal conversation
action was also criticized for affirming a wife's status as property
because it was brought only by her husband who alleged the loss
of her services. ° The wife was not a party to criminal conversa-
tion actions and her consent to the seduction was deemed irrele-
346. See PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 228; see also Wolfram, supra note 2, at 170 (detail-
ing the amount of damages awards in Parliamentary divorces between 1780 and 1857).
347. See PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 228. See generally Staves, supra note 27.
348. See 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 912-30; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note
2, at 273-85. See generally KOROBKIN, supra note 27.
349. Interestingly, both Lady Westmeath and Caroline Norton were accused by their
husbands of having committed adultery with powerful men of the time (the Duke of Wel-
lington in the former and Prime Minister Melbourne in the latter); only the latter's hus-
band actually filed a criminal conversation action against his wife's alleged lover and lost.
Norton v. Lord Melbourne, 132 Eng. Rep. 335 (P. 1836). But, both actions were seen by
many commentators of the period as having been motivated more by political designs than
by hurt feelings. See STONE, BROKEN LIVES, supra note 2, at 310-11.
350. The action is in the same class as seduction and breach of promise of marriage ac-
tions-so-called heartbalm actions-which originated in the property actions of ravish-
ment of ward. See Jane Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature
'Deceit"'; A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 382-94 (1993).
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vant.3 1' Nor could she bring a similar suit against her husband's
mistress under the old criminal conversation action.352 Although
damages actions in the new court did allow the wife to be a party
to the suit, these actions were clearly tainted by the old male-
dominated criminal conversation action. In the debates on the
1857 statute, lawmakers spent some time deriding the old action
and trying to justify its continuation in the new court, but the
lack of substantive legal change in the damages action suggests
that social changes, more than the modest legal reform, caused
the size and number of these awards to so dramatically drop.
353
While damages were seen as an important disincentive to seduc-
ers-making them think twice before breaking up another man's
family-they were also seen as a way men could buy and sell one
another's wives. One wonders if this so-called wife-selling de-
clined because women could now bring their own divorce actions
and were no longer willing to be bought and sold as high-class
chattel, or because they were seen as better able to provide for
themselves after 1858.
Historians of masculinity have also noted that in the nine-
teenth century, changing notions of male honor made it unseemly
for husbands to accept money from their wives' seducers.5 4 Yet,
discouraging seduction was an important aspect of Victorian mo-
rality.355 Without abolishing the action, Parliament allowed the
court to continue damages actions, but it encouraged putting the
awards to the benefit of the fallen wife. Hence, in nearly half of
the cases involving sums over £100, the money was used to pro-
vide for the wife or her illegitimate children and did not end up in
the husband's pocket.357 In either event, the scarcity of awards
suggests that the possibility of damages posed little disincentive
351. See NORTON, LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 7, at 10-11; NUGENT,
WESTMEATH, supra note 7, at 103-06.
352. Id.
353. 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 912-30.
354. See generally Staves, supra note 27, and TOSH, supra note 37, at 154-55 (concern-
ing the effects of the separate domestic sphere on middle-class men and the social purity
movement's efforts to rein in male sexuality). Most members of Parliament saw the crimi-
nal conversation action as a national embarrassment and sought to abolish it, while still
providing a disincentive to men to seduce other men's wives. 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1857) 912-30.
355. See Larson, supra note 350, at 388-93; MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 130-34 (de-
tailing the complex issues arising in these damages actions).
356. See infra tbl. 19.
357. This was permitted pursuant to section XXXIII of the act. An Act to Amend the
Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, §
XXXIII (1857) (Eng.). It is also possible that some of the other awards were put to the
wife's use by informal or mutually agreed upon settlements.
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to seduction, especially when the award was no longer a prereq-
uisite to a divorce.
The second way in which the court could order property settle-
ments for wives occurred when the wife proved the grounds for
her divorce or judicial separation and the court believed the prop-
erty of the parties needed readjustment or the adulterous wife
had brought property to the marriage that, in all fairness, should
be readjusted for her benefit.35 As with the damages awards,
these property settlements were also quite rare-thirteen total
out of 957 cases of divorce and judicial separation.5 9 Eight of
these occurred in cases brought by wives and five in cases
brought by husbands. 6 ° Twelve were in cases of divorce and only
one in a case for a judicial separation.36' Most important, how-
ever, was the form which the property settlements took. Four in-
volved settlements to trustees or variations in trust settlements;
two were one-time payments to the wife; three were settlement
provisions for the children of the marriage-one of which may
have been for an illegitimate child born by the wife to her lover;
one was a property settlement on the wife; two were readjust-
ments to property acquired from the parents upon marriage; and
one was of unknown disposition.362 It is unclear if the settlements
on the wife were in trust or were to be placed directly in her con-
trol. Not considering those, the majority of settlements involved
property provisions that were purposefully settled out of the
wife's control-four to trustees and three to children.363 Most
likely, the readjustments for property acquired from parents were
also in trust, and the settlements would have been annuities or
some form of investment in which the wife would have a yearly
income. Thus, only two of the thirteen settlements clearly gave
the wife immediate control over property; the rest most likely
were settled out of her reach and under the control of male trus-
tees.3"'
358. MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 126, 157 (noting that an American precedent of set-
tling property (in that case slaves) on the wife would not be followed in England).
359. See infra tbl. 20.
360. See infra tbl. 20.
361. See infra tbl. 20.
362. See infra tbl. 20.
363. See infra tbl. 20.
364. This trend, unfortunately, is not so unusual even today when elective share stat-
utes often allow husbands to meet their marital property obligations by merely leaving
their wives a life estate in trust for the statutory share. Upon divorce this is not the case,
but settlements in trust reflect outmoded views that wives are incompetent money han-
dlers and require male trustees if they are to be kept from squandering their money or fal-
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See Table 20 in Appendix:
Property Settlements on Wives (1858-1861)
These rare property settlements tell us an important story. In a
little more than 1% of divorce and judicial separation actions a
property settlement was ordered.365 There were more than ten
times as many alimony orders made,366 indicating that divorce
was not likely to result in the parties walking away with a final
property settlement that would enable them to avoid future con-
tact with one another. While many divorces today result in prop-
erty dispositions that constitute a final, one-time split of the cou-
ple's assets,367 this type of severance was rare indeed in the early
years of the new court. Although there may certainly have been
many more instances of out of court property agreements between
divorcing husbands and wives than are noted here-even agree-
ments that definitively settled their property claims-very few of
those were adjudicated by the court as part of the dissolution
process.3 61 This suggests one of three conclusions: (1) that the
court envisioned ongoing obligations of husband to wife, through
alimony as the normal model of post-dissolution interspousal
property relations; (2) that the parties used private property
agreements to settle the support obligations of husbands and to
return a wife's property back to her side of the family; or (3) that
most parties did not have enough property to concern the court in
the first place. A combination of all three is likely to be true.
When we add to these relatively scarce awards the dwindling
number of protective orders, we find that, as the decade pro-
gressed, putting adequate property into a wife's hands post-
dissolution apparently was not a principal concern of the court.
The court's power to modify property arrangements as provided
in the 1857 Act, which was limited to making provisions for "the
innocent Party, and of the Children of the Marriage,"369 was
ling prey to unscrupulous seducers. See, e.g., Ira Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other
Partial Interests of the Surviving Spouse Under the Redesigned Elective-Share System:
Some Concerns and Suggestions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 941, 950-53 (1992); Wendy C. Gerzog,
The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1994-1995); Mary M. Wenig, "Taxing Marriage," 6 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 561, 567-68 (1996).
365. See infra tbls. 3, 20.
366. See infra tbls. 20, 21.
367. Of course, many modern property settlements are moving back toward a commin-
gling of property post-divorce, as with the qualified domestic relations orders used to deal
with pension assets.
368. See infra tbl. 20.
369. See An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Cases, 20 & 21
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enlarged in 1859 to include consideration of ante-nuptial or post-
nuptial settlements on either party and could be altered for the
benefit of either, regardless of fault."' Thus, the court did not
have the power to alter settlements made on the marriage of the
parties by parents or friends until the 1859 amendments,7 1
though they could make property distribution orders for property
owned as marital property from the court's inception.7 2 According
to legal commentators, property settlements were motivated by a
rule of protecting the innocent spouse as much as possible.
The guiding principle of the cases is, that where the breaking up of
the home is due to the conduct of the respondent, the Court ought to
place the petitioner and the children, as nearly as possib in the
same position as if the family life had not been interrupted.
The scarcity of these orders, however, undermines this claim of
legal significance while supporting an interpretation that marital
property was very likely to be deemed the sole property of the
husband and not subject to adjustments to support an innocent or
guilty wife.
While modifying property arrangements between divorcing
spouses was not a priority of Parliament either, the property set-
tlements do tell us a few things about the use of the court for set-
tling property upon divorce. Ironically, while many women had
complained about the way fathers denied mothers access to their
children in order to get their wives' consent to invade separately
settled property, 4 only one of the property settlements arose in a
case in which custody of children had been an issue. This sug-
gests that for most married couples, custody of children and prop-
erty were not intertwined. The number of settlements are so
small given the number of cases that were heard by the court dur-
ing this period that the most obvious conclusion is that most peo-
ple handled their property settlements outside the notice and au-
Vict., c. 85, § XIV (1857) (Eng.).
370. See An Act to Make Further Provision Concerning the Court for Divorce and Mat-
rimonial Cases, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 61, § XLV (1859) (Eng.).
371. See id.
372. See Norris v. Norris, 164 Eng. Rep. 680, 681 (P. 1858).
373. LATEY & BROWNE, supra note 230, at 169.
374. Even if the actual data does not show evidence of this method of intimidation and
"bargaining," there is a strong belief among women that men will use a demand for cus-
tody in the divorce to get their wives to reduce their property claims. For example, this
occurred in the Westmeath and Norton cases. See NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE,
supra note 7, at VIII; NUGENT, WESTMEATH, supra note 7, at 73, 93-94; STONE, BROKEN
LINES, supra note 2, at 312; see also Bailey, supra note 30, at 413. For a thorough discus-
sion of modern U.S. child custody statistics, see generally ELEANOR E. MACCOBY, ET AL.
DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992).
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thority of the court. And, when they did come before the court, the
result was most likely a settlement for the benefit of the wife,
which she could not directly control. 7
C. Alimony Awards
The most common form of settling property disagreements be-
tween separating couples was an award of alimony. Notably, a
wife was entitled to alimony pendente lite whether she was the
petitioner or the respondent. But only if a wife was successful,
would a permanent alimony order be entered, which was rarely
for the same amount, if any, as the amount of the alimony
pendente lite. Usually, alimony pendente lite would be calculated
at approximately one-fifth of the family's income, while perma-
nent alimony would be calculated at between one-third and one-
half of the family's income.376 But the number of instances in
which a separate permanent alimony order was entered after an
alimony pendente lite order was granted was rare, so it is difficult
to confirm the legal norm that permanent alimony would be
higher than temporary alimony.377 In looking at alimony orders, I
generally did not distinguish between permanent and temporary
alimony orders, assuming that any award of alimony was likely to
give the wife the moral and perhaps legal right to demand that
her ex-husband pay her bills or release funds for her benefit. Be-
cause the parties could structure their alimony payments as they
chose, I can only remark on the frequency with which the court
granted alimony petitions, their amounts, and the frequency with
375. Settlements in trust and settlements for children, which made up seven of the to-
tal number of properly settlements, were settlement types the wife could not directly con-
trol. See infra tbl. 20.
376. Cornish & Clark, supra note 2, at 389; MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 137; see also
Whieldon v. Whieldon, 2 Sw. & Tr. 388 (1861).
377. This partly confirms Lawrence Stone's claim about women's use of the court to
gain alimony. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 183. Mr. Henley, in the
House of Commons, agreed that "[i]n many cases at present suits were instituted solely
with the object of getting the Court to settle alimony, and when that had been done no fur-
ther steps were taken." 147 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1259. There may be an important
distinction to be made between alimony and an annual property settlement or mainte-
nance. Generally, women who obtained separations were entitled to alimony, while women
who obtained dissolutions were entitled to a property settlement; it is difficult to tell
which was better. But in 1861, Sir Cresswell ruled that a property settlement upon di-
vorce should be less than alimony because "the wife ought not to be left destitute; on the
other hand, I think it would not be politic to give to wives any great pecuniary interest in
obtaining a dissolution of the marriage tie." Fisher v. Fisher, 164 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1056 (P.
1861); Freeman, supra note 5, at 337 n.162.
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which the court issued writs of attachment for non-payment of
alimony.
The court ordered alimony in a total of 153 cases during the
three and one-third years covered by the court docket. 378 That
represents eighty-five in divorce actions, fifty-eight in judicial
separation actions, four in restitution of conjugal rights actions,
one in an annulment action, and five in actions that were un-
known." 9 There were a total of 1,005311 causes of action noted in
the docket for this period, so alimony orders occurred in roughly
14.6% of cases; it was requested in approximately 178 cases (or
17%).381 There was no significant increase in the number of ali-
mony orders made over the three and one-third year period,
though there was a decrease in the length of time the court took
between the filing of the petition and the granting of the order.
Alimony pendente lite petitions were usually filed immediately af-
ter the petition for termination, and permanent alimony petitions
usually were not filed until shortly before, or sometimes after, the
final termination hearing. Alimony was requested in ninety-four
cases in the full docket and granted in eighty-one of those. This
indicates a success rate of more than 86% for the alimony peti-
tions noted in the docket.
But, a high success rate is to be expected when we consider
that all wives, whether as petitioner or respondent, were legally
entitled to alimony."2 A legal entitlement to alimony, however,
did not guarantee meaningful financial support. Many of these
alimony awards were granted in cases brought by husbands for
divorce that were ultimately successful, thus representing very
short-term financial commitments to wives who had gone astray.
Also, the number of alimony awards that were granted in cases in
which the wife's suit was dismissed or where either party's case
was not continued reflect tenuous or short-lived support pay-
378. See infra tbl. 21.
379. See infra tbl. 21.
380. This number does not include the ninety-nine petitions for protective orders of
property. See infra tbl. 15.
381. See infra tbl. 21. There were ninety-four requests in the full docket, out of which
came eighty-one orders. In the summary docket there were seventy-two orders which, if
we calculate requests at the same rate, would indicate approximately eighty-four requests
in the summary docket, for a total of 178 requests during the first three and one-third
years.
382. The high success rate for women who asked for alimony obscures the fact that
85.4% of all wives received no alimony protections, either because they did not ask for it
(83%), or they were denied it (2.4%). See infra tbl. 3; infra tbl. 21.
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ments. 38 3 Of the 153 alimony orders, as many as ninety-four (or
61%) were likely to be short-lived or legally unenforceable if the
husband refused to pay.384
See Table 21 in Appendix:
Alimony Awards (1858-1861)
Not surprisingly, husbands then, as today, did not always pay
their alimony in a timely manner. The court issued thirty-six
writs of attachment against husbands for non-payment of court
ordered obligations-twenty were for non-payment of court costs
and sixteen were for non-payment of alimony. At least 10% of
husbands apparently defaulted on their alimony obligations.8 5
Moreover, fewer than 15% of wives who were entitled at least to
alimony pendente lite actually petitioned for it. 386 While this may
have reflected the simple reality that many wives knew they
would be unable to collect, especially from husbands who had de-
serted them, it does show that a few wives did leave the court
with some form of financial support, even if it was just tempo-
rary.
In sum, in the first three and one-third years, ninety-nine
wives sought protective orders for property, 153 received at least
short-term alimony, thirteen received a property settlement, and
six may have received some settlement from damages awards."'
All told, 271 wives, out of 1,144 cases (24%) emerged from the
new court with a property order that would give them some inde-
pendent way to protect their livelihood and property. 8 8 But, lest
we think that one-quarter of wives had adequate support post-
dissolution, ninety-four of the alimony awards were in cases with
little likelihood of long-term continuation.8 9 Thus, those wives
most likely lost all support upon termination of the marital suits.
383. The number of not continued suits may also indicate the extent to which wives did
in fact seek primarily alimony and, once obtained, choose to discontinue their suits. See
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 183.
384. The short-lived alimony cases were those in which the husband's suit was granted
(thirty-nine) and the wife's suit was dismissed (twenty), or either spouse's suit was aban-
doned (thirty-five). See infra tbl. 21.
385. Husbands defaulted in sixteen out of the 153 alimony awards granted by the
court. See infra tbl. 21. That percentage may be even higher if we consider only those
fifty-nine alimony awards that were likely to be of longstanding duration.
386. Every wife could ask for alimony pendente lite during the suit, whether she was
the petitioner or the respondent; sixty-three wives did request alimony pendente lite in di-
vorce suits brought by their husbands. MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 136.
387. See infra tbls. 19-21.
388. See infra tbls. 2, 19-21.
389. See infra tbl. 21.
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So too did those wives (six) who received a settlement from the
damages awards ordered upon the co-respondents; neither their
husbands nor their lovers were required to support them after the
dissolution. Those wives who sought a protective order did so be-
cause they already had acquired separately earned property and
their husbands had deserted them so they had no illusions of sup-
port from their male breadwinners. Only sixty-seven wives
initiated suits and received some form of compensation along
with their marital termination, either in alimony or a property
settlement,390 and over half of those women received alimony of
less than £50 per year.3 91
The number of protective orders shows that one in six women
were more interested in protecting their property than in ridding
themselves of errant husbands, and the court responded favora-
bly to their petitions. But the relative infrequency of a property
settlement or alimony order that would allow a wife to be sup-
ported by her former husband shows that post-dissolution prop-
erty settlement was not a priority for the court or the litigants,
and that few women left the court with an order for ongoing sup-
port by their former spouses. In the absence of any other evi-
dence, it would appear that the vast majority of wives left the
court protected from errant husbands raiding their savings, but
without any meaningful support or property settlement that
would provide for their living post-divorce. There were fewer than
ten cases in which the court identified any sums that were to be
used for child support. So most of these women were left to the
care of their families, to their own ingenuity and skill to make a
living, or to the benevolence of their seducers; and less than 1%
could expect any help supporting the children-if they were even
lucky enough to get a custody order or they retained de facto cus-
tody.
VIII. CLASS VARIATION FOR CLIENTS OF THE NEW COURT
Determining the class of the petitioners and respondents was
difficult because information on the economic status of the parties
was scarce and gave only broad, general indicators of class. I
noted, where available, the occupations of the parties-usually
the husband-from the petitions. I also noted the size of alimony
390. See infra tbls. 19-21.
391. See infra Part VII.C. and tbl. 23 for a discussion of alimony.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
awards in order to get an indication of the annual income of the
couple. Alimony was usually set at one-fifth to one-third of the
family's annual income.392 I noted property settlements, and their
size, when available. The alimony and property settlements, as
noted above, were quite rare, arising in fewer than 16% of marital
termination cases-153 alimony awards, thirteen property set-
tlements, and six damages awards 393 -so it is only a small per-
centage of families for whom we have even this sparse data. Fi-
nally, I noted court costs. Although these costs are not directly
correlated to class, there appeared to be certain cases that cost
significantly more than the average, and I would assume that
poorer couples could not afford the most expensive attorneys and
procedures. While most cases seemed to cost around £100 to
reach a final dissolution order, there were some in which the
court, inexplicably, required a deposit of £800 before setting the
matter for a final hearing and nothing in the docket indicated
why.394 On the other extreme, a few cases were filed in forma
pauperis by petitioners who claimed to be below the threshold
level of £5 yearly income to bring suit. Thus, to analyze the par-
ties by class, I used three markers-occupation, alimony, and
costs-recognizing that these are very broad markers indeed.
A. Occupation
Although half of the petitions were brought by wives, they were
very reticent in identifying what, if any, occupation in which they
were engaged. Of the few petitions that listed an occupation for
the wife, they depict wives who were either in the service indus-
try (cooks or servants), some form of dressmaking business
(dressmaker, milliner, or trimmings shopkeeper), or kept a public
house.395 One lived in the workhouse. 396 There was far greater in-
formation about the occupations of husbands, though out of 551
petitions the husband's occupation was identified in only thirty-
eight.397 The majority of these occupations would be considered
392. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
393. See infra tbls. 2, 19-21.
394. It would appear that these large deposit requirements were a form of escrow for
couples disputing property settlements and were required by the court to cover not only
legal fees and costs, but perhaps also the cost of a later expected property settlement for
the wife.
395. See infra tbl. 22.
396. See infra tbl. 22.
397. See infra tbl. 22.
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solid working-class (sailor, miner, carpenter, fisherman, railway
porter, publican, valet, clerk, plumber, and soldier). A few were
respectable middle-class occupations (manager of a silk company,
landscape painter, music teacher, engineering worker, minister,
solicitor, captain in the highlanders, and officer in the East India
Company). Only about six cases indicated that some member of
the aristocracy was involved. And on the other end, five husbands
were in prison, and one was a gambler. One was even a servant to
the famous ecclesiastical court jurist, Dr. Lushington.
See Table 22 in Appendix:
List of Occupations by Husband and Wife
While we cannot draw any firm conclusions about the class of
the petitioners from thirty-eight cases, what we do see is a rela-
tively even cross-section across urban occupations. Servants,
clerks, and prisoners on one end, to engineers, teachers, minis-
ters, and aristocrats on the other. What is notably missing, how-
ever, are indications of rural occupations. Other than fishermen,
and perhaps the miner, there are no occupations listed that would
be identified as rural or agricultural workers. 99 While many of
the soldiers may have been stationed in rural areas, most of these
husbands probably worked in London in order to have access to
the court. Although there may not have been an explicit class bias
by the court, there would certainly have been a geographic bias
against non-Londoners.400 There were also frequent references to
husbands who had deserted their wives-who were in China,
New Zealand, Australia, and the United States-but few indica-
tions of their occupations in these countries were given.
The evidence about occupation that exists is anecdotal at best,
though when we include the number of cases that were brought
in forma pauperis, we see at least some effort by the court to
398. Gail Savage undertook an analysis of the divorce and separation cases that were
reported in The London Times for the fifty years following passage of the divorce act. Her
findings show similar class patterns: eight in the military, twenty-one in trades (drapers,
clothiers, and shopkeepers), nine in the working class (butler, carpenter, sailor, and com-
positor), two were men of independent means, four were professionals (doctors, solicitors,
and clergy), two were clerks, four were in the theatre, plus a smattering of other profes-
sions (architect, engineers, veterinary surgeon, newspaper editor, stockbrokers, and mas-
ter of a boy's school). See Gail L. Savage, The Operation of the 1857 Divorce Act, 1860-
1910: A Research Note, 16 J. SOc. HIST. 103, 106 (1983).
399. See infra tbl. 22.
400. Parliament addressed this very problem in the debates, and its solution was to set
the court in London but make certain issues triable at nisi prius. 142 Parl. Deb. 1980,
1986 (1856).
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serve low-income populations. In the first three and one-third
years, nine pauper cases were brought out of 1,045-five by wives
and four by husbands. 40 1 Because many of these cases cost be-
tween £80 and £100 to bring, and the court was located in Lon-
don, the prevalence of respectable working and middle-class oc-
cupations is not surprising. More information is needed to
determine exactly how well the new court made divorce available
to all classes of people.40 2
B. Alimony Orders
The alimony orders granted by the court in the first three and
one-third years also show the range of class of the petitioners.
Over half of the awards were for less than £50 per year, indicat-
ing yearly household incomes of about £150 to £250 per year.40 3
Less than 10% (twelve out of 153) were for £200 per year or more,
indicating household incomes of around £1000 per year.40 4 There
was no alimony award of more than £1000 per year, which indi-
cates that the very rich were not seeking alimony awards in the
court. This too is not surprising, as the very wealthy were likely
to have had complex settlements and equitable estates that would
have been fully entailed long before the parties sought a divorce
or separation. It is perhaps significant, however, that a wife was
more likely to get an alimony award in a case brought by her
husband than in one brought by herself if the amount was at the
low end (less than £50 per year),40 5 but in the higher income
brackets the numbers are reversed.4 6 Overall, wives received
alimony in ninety cases initiated by themselves and in sixty-three
cases brought by husbands.4 v
401. See also MACQUEEN, supra note 10, at 365 (elaborating on the procedure for suing
in forma pauperis).
402. See GLENDON, supra note 5, for discussion of how the lower classes demanded the
formalities afforded by the courts in the United States.
403. See infra tbl. 23. An income of £150 to £300 per year indicates a lower, middle-
class existence in the nineteenth century; a family in this range could eat well and employ
a servant. In London, however, a typical middle-class family would have two to three ser-
vants and require an income of £500 to £2000 per year. See DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note
183, at 23; TOSH, supra note 37, at 12.
404. Assuming alimony at one-third to one-fifth yearly income, an alimony award of
£200 would indicate a likely income of £600 to £1000 per year.
405. See infra tbl. 23.
406. See infra tbl. 23.
407. See infra tbl. 23. The slight difference in numbers reflects the "other" category
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See Table 23 in Appendix:
Alimony Orders in Docket (1858-1861)
Table 23 shows that, at the lowest income bracket, wives asked
for alimony just as often in suits they brought as in suits their
husbands brought-seventeen in suits by husbands and seven-
teen in suits by wives 4"'-but as the income levels grew, wives
asked for alimony in significantly greater proportions in suits
they brought than in suits brought by their husbands.4"9 The de-
cline of alimony requests by wives in divorce suits brought by
husbands may indicate that these fallen women had other likely
means of support from their seducers. Also, as we move up the in-
come scale, a demand of alimony was not likely to stop the suit
and, therefore, would not operate strategically to get their hus-
bands to discontinue the termination action. It is also likely indi-
cated that the income level of the wife's seducer was comparable
to that of the husband, and that the costs of the suit or the wife's
support were not overly taxing.410 At the lowest income levels,
alimony pendente lite petitions were common, which may indicate
that wives at the lower income levels needed the alimony more
than wives at the middle and upper levels. At the upper levels,
permanent alimony was more likely to be requested by wives in
their own termination suits than in suits brought by their hus-
bands. Although the numbers are relatively small (153), alimony
requests clustered most in income levels under £200 per year and,
as mentioned earlier, less than half would have resulted in any
long-term, post-termination support.4 '
which includes cases brought by wives and husbands.
408. See infra tbl. 23.
409. Twenty men and twenty-nine women received between £26 to £50, while eight
men and twenty-one women received £51 to £75. See infra tbL 23. Four men and twelve
women received between £76 to £100; however, four men and six women were awarded
between £101 and £150. See infra tbl. 23.
410. Sybil Wolfram's work also shows a relative similarity in the class status of hus-
bands and co-respondents in criminal conversation actions. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at
164, 186.
411. See infra tbl. 23. Family income levels of around £200 per year would generally
indicate a lower, middle-class range in rural settings and, perhaps, an upper, working-
class range in the city. See infra note 403. The fact that most alimony awards clustered
in this range suggests that alimony was primarily a form of relief for lower-income level
petitioners.
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C. Orders on Costs
Orders on costs occurred in about one-fifth of cases-101 in the
court docket and eighty-six in the summary docket database for a
total of 17.7%---and the average award of costs was £115.412 While
court costs obviously correlate to whether the suit was opposed,
the number of pleadings, whether it went to a jury, and the like,
the wealthier the parties the better able they would be to pursue
extensive and costly litigation tactics. The least amount of costs
for an undefended complete termination action was £14, while the
most expensive was £1,260. The few cases with excessive costs
skews the average amount toward the high end. One hundred
forty-four cases had costs under £150,413 while only forty-two had
costs exceeding £150.414 The median cost was 280.4 '
See Table 24 in Appendix:
Costs (1858-1861)
If the majority of alimony orders arose in families whose yearly
income was around £150, and the median cost of a divorce or ju-
dicial separation was £80, then many people were willing to
spend roughly half their yearly income to resolve their marital
problems. Moreover, the amount listed by the court for costs gen-
erally included only the wife's attorney's fees and court costs in
suits by wives, or the husband's and wife's attorney's fees and
court costs in suits by husbands, in which the costs would be
taxed to the co-respondent. Thus, the attorney's fees of the person
taxed with costs would rarely be included in the amount ordered
by the court, so the amount identified could be as low as 50% of
the true cost.
Although the costs are going to tell us more about the complex-
ity of the court's procedure than about the class of the parties, it
is notable that the court entered orders on costs in less than 20%
of cases.416 Naturally, the costs involved in the protective property
orders were minimal and, not surprisingly, were not indicated in
the docket.417 In addition, the large percentage of cases that were
412. See infra tbl. 24. The average cost of £115 was an average of the exact costs or-
dered for all 187 cases.
413. See infra tbl. 24.
414. See infra tbl. 24.
415. See infra tbl. 24.
416. See infra tbl. 24.
417. These deserted wives also could not serve notice on their husbands in order to
seek an order on costs, so compensation simply was not an option.
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not continued would not result in an order on costs.418 And, the
court often ordered the co-respondent or the respondent to pay
costs without entering a specific amount. Besides the 101 orders
on costs identified in the court docket, an additional 157 orders on
costs were made without indicating an amount. Thus, the court
made some sort of order on costs in 44% of the total cases filed-
61% of cases that were either dismissed or granted.419 In the re-
maining 56% of cases, the costs would presumably lie with each
party unless arrangements were made outside the court.
The expenses and costs of court proceedings clearly had differ-
ent effects on men and women. Women were never expected to
pay their own costs, even if they were guilty of the marital fault,
because the law of coverture denied them any property with
which to pay them. Women who had been deserted, however,
would have to find enough money to pay their lawyers and the
court costs up-front because there was little likelihood of any re-
imbursement, even though they were entitled to it. Perhaps law-
yers took these cases on a type of contingent fee basis, being will-
ing to forego payment until a final judgment would restore a wife
to feme sole status and she could legally pay her own expenses.
And many women may have had fathers or brothers willing to
foot their bills. Either is a phenomenon that is difficult to un-
cover.
Petitioning husbands would have to pay all costs of litigation
for both themselves and their wives through to a final order, and
only after an order taxing costs to the co-respondent and, per-
haps, the costs of a writ of attachment might they obtain recovery
from their wives' seducers. This certainly had a differential im-
pact on middle and lower-class men, the latter often not being
able to front the attorney's fees for both sides of the litigation just
to get rid of an adulterous wife. On the other hand, until the court
ordered a separation, a wife had no control over money and prop-
erty and certainly could not be expected to pay her own costs.
And, if the co-respondent was unknown or unable to pay any or-
dered costs, all legal expenses would fall to the husband.
418. An award on costs only occurred at the termination of the suit, either through
granting or denial of a petition. Suits that were abandoned did not yield an order on costs.
419. The cases that were not continued would not have an order on costs. Thus, of the
cases that reached a final order, 61% included an order on costs. The other 39% of cases
reaching a final order, however, simply had no mention made of any issue relating to
costs. Of the 730 petitions that resulted in a final order, 187 had specific cost orders with
an amount and 157 ordered costs without an amount. See infra tbls. 5, 24.
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Getting a sense of the class of the litigants in this new court is
difficult, and my conclusions are obviously quite tentative. Not
surprisingly, though, the groups least represented appear to be
the extremely wealthy and the extremely poor. Those working-
class and lower, middle-class couples who did choose to use the
court to end their marriages, however, appeared willing to spend
upwards of £100 to divest themselves of an adulterous husband
or wife. Considering that the majority of the litigants of both
sexes had been married more than ten years,420 they may have
accumulated adequate assets to pay the court costs and attorney's
fees without significant financial harm. The rather high costs
may indeed have contributed to the relative infrequency of di-
vorces by husbands and wives in the first five years of marriage
and in the latest years of marriage where earning potential may
have been relatively low or the benefits perceived to be not worth
the costs.
IX. CONCLUSION
The new divorce court faced a number of difficulties when it
opened its doors on January 1, 1858. It was expected to cure the
injustices of the earlier cases without causing any major upset to
the status quo. Divorces were to be rare and discouraged, but
truly deserving wives were to be released from their domestic
hell. Husbands of adulterous wives were to be given a cheaper,
simpler process to set aside their wives and begin anew, espe-
cially if they had no legitimate heirs. The worst aspects of cover-
ture were to be mitigated to allow working-class wives the ability
to continue as productive economic actors. But the substantive
rules were not to change. Divorce was a social evil to be discour-
aged; the only wives who were to get a divorce had to be particu-
larly deserving, and the Victorian family was to remain staunchly
under the control of the family patriarch. But, despite what
seems like minor substantive changes in the law, the court was
tremendously popular. And being popular meant that it eventu-
ally became an accepted part of the legal institution of marriage
and profoundly changed some aspects of marital behavior.
The fact that more women brought suit than men was probably
the most unforeseen result. But the high rate of default (i.e., un-
defended) suits was probably equally unforeseen, as Parliament
420. See infra tbl. 9.
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expected the court to follow earlier rules on connivance and collu-
sion strictly. Sir Cresswell's seeming unconcern with the vast
number of default cases may have stemmed less from his concern
about conspiracy and collusion than his recognition that despite
the idealistic world of law and religious dogma, these people
really needed their marriages terminated. The reality of adultery,
cruelty, and desertion was, I could imagine, so overwhelming in
Sir Cresswell's eyes that fear of collusion simply lost its cogency.
In the eyes of Parliament, however, the new court truly inau-
gurated the divorce epidemic. The rate of divorce petitions rose
from four to 324 in one year, an increase of 8,100%.421 In that
sense, the court was profoundly influential. And despite the rela-
tive conservativeness of the substantive legal changes, the insti-
tution of civil divorce has also had profound effects on the modern
family. As the legal double-standards have been slowly elimi-
nated, the rates of divorce petitions by men and women have ac-
tually changed very little, with women still filing slightly more
than half of all marital termination actions.422 When it was
harder for women to get a divorce, they still did so at roughly
equal rates to men.423 What this tells us about the law's influence
on divorce rates may be rather humbling to those of us who be-
lieve the law has important influence on social practices.
One of the facts that I find particularly disturbing, though per-
haps not unexpected, is the infrequency of child custody and
property orders emanating from the new court. Although the total
numbers seem low-within the 10% to 20% range424 -they may be
quite high under the circumstances. Exploring the lives of the
men and women who came before the court to discover their mo-
tives and desires is clearly further work that remains to be done.
While the court may not have provided many wives with post-
divorce property protection, we cannot say that these women
were worse off, were left to starve or rely on charity, or even
would have wanted future support. Their lives, motives, and de-
sires remain unknown. But this research has uncovered some im-
portant information; namely, that child support orders, joint cus-
tody, property settlements, and damages awards were utilized in
the mid-nineteenth century even though we often assume they
421. See infra tbl. 3.
422. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 2, at 386 (showing wives receiving more
than 70% of divorce decrees in 1986).
423. See infra tbl. 5 and discussion supra Part V.B.
424. See infra tbis. 11-15, 19-21.
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are fairly modern legal innovations. And the scarcity of these
awards suggests that for most men and women, marital termina-
tion was their principal goal; they did not use the court for stra-
tegic ends.
Most important, the information recorded in these court re-
cords is invaluable for giving us a small window into the lives of
many urban middle-class marriages, albeit dysfunctional ones.
From this window we see how people's use of legal remedies
changed as the law changed, as their marriages aged, and as
their circumstances evolved. The amount of adultery, cruelty, de-
sertion, and other significant events seems to have fluctuated
over the course of most marriages. People's responses to these
events also differed as their marriages aged. While much more
work remains to be done with these materials, I hope to shed
some light on the relationship of mid-nineteenth-century families
to law and courts. Moreover, I hope this study has inspired others
to investigate further how and why the people who chose to go to
the law did so, and whether they got what they wanted. For only
when we can begin to answer these questions can we know
whether the law serves the needs of humans, or humans serve
the needs of the law.
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Table 22: List of Professions of Wives and Husbands
Wife ] Husband
Public Housekeeper
Sells Trimmings
Living in Workhouse
Milliner
Cook
Dressmaker
Sailor
Gambler
In Prison
Servant to Dr. Lushington
Miner
Manager of Silk Company
Carpenter
Fisherman
Printer
Railroad Porter
Landscape Painter
Horse Guard
Publican
Watchmaker
Valet
Engineering Worker
Music Teacher
Ship's Carpenter
Minister
Clerk
Solicitor
Plumber
Captain in Highlanders
Officer in East India Co.
Soldier
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